GST AND INDIAN FEDERALISM: NEGOTIATING CENTRAL AUTHORITY AND STATE AUTONOMY

Authors

  • Dhananjay Kumar Singh Research Scholar - Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia Awadh University, Ayodhya (U.P.)
  • Binod Pratap Singh Prof. and Head of the Department of Commerce, LBS PG College Gonda, Affiliated with Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia Awadh University, Ayodhya (U.P.)

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.29121/shodhkosh.v5.i2.2024.6229

Keywords:

Gst, Fiscal Federalism, State Autonomy, Central Authority, Gst Council, Revenue Trends, Cooperative Federalism, India

Abstract [English]

The Goods and Services Tax (GST) introduced in 2017 is one of the seminal fiscal reforms in post-independence India. GST sought to create a single, common market by removing a fractured system of state-level indirect taxes and, in the process, prevent double taxation and eventually improve the economies of scale and productivity of businesses. The reform also changed the nature of India’s federal architecture, prompting questions about the balance between central authority and state autonomy. Using the perspective of fiscal federalism, this paper analyses the changes that the introduced GST has brought to the area of financial dependency and political negotiation surrounding the transfer of taxing powers from the states to the Centre.
Relying on secondary statistics from the Reserve Bank of India’s reports, the Ministry of Finance’s publications, the GST Council proceedings, and existing academic studies, the study highlights three main findings. Firstly, even though the GST has rationalized tax compliance and expanded the tax base, it has also concentrated substantial tax powers, weakening states’ fiscal autonomy. Second, while the mechanism for compensating states had been designed to avoid vagaries in state revenues, it has bred dependency in the long run, as emerged so sharply during the COVID-19 crisis when late transfers exposed the underbelly of states. Third, the GST Council was envisaged as a forum of collaboration but exhibits both collaboration and asymmetry, in the sense that the Centre has more power to impose its will.
The paper demonstrates that the GST has been contributing to national economic integration and infringes on the autonomy of states. Reform to preserve India’s federal balance involves compensation being paid in a timely manner, the threshold or the need for the financial consent of the states for compensation being reduced and flexibility being provided to more and less fiscally capable states and to differing stages of economic development.

References

Bagchi, A. (2020). The delicate balance between GST and Indian federalism remains unresolved. Economic and Political Weekly, 55(15), 45–53.

Bird, R., & Gendron, P. (2018). VAT and Federal Countries Federal countries use the Value Added Tax (VAT). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chakraborty, L. (2021). Indian states receive GST compensation as well as fiscal autonomy. National Institute of Public Finance and Policy Working Paper, 340, 1–20.

Mukherjee, S. (2020). GST and federalism: What the GST Council does. Indian Journal of Public Administration, 66(2), 137–152. https://doi.org/10.1177/0019556120925169

Rao, M. G. (2019). Centralization under GST: Impact of GST on fiscal federalism in India. Journal of Indian Public Policy, 5(3), 101-119.

Reserve Bank of India. (2021). State budgets: Analysis of the source of funds. Mumbai: Reserve Bank of India. Retrieved from https://www.rbi.org.in

Government of India. (2017). The Constitution (One Hundred and First Amendment) Act, 2016. New Delhi: Ministry of Law and Justice.

Government of India. (2017). The GST (Compensation to States) Act, 2017. New Delhi: Ministry of Finance.

th Finance Commission. (2021). The Finance Commission has submitted its report for 2021–26. New Delhi: Government of India.

Kumar, A., & Singh, R. (2021). Emerging Discourses: Both the Goods and Services Tax and the co-operative federalism in India throw up their contours and challenges. Journal of Federal Studies 31(1): 23–41.

Singh, S. (2020). GST and state finance: Evaluation of post-reform revenue trends. Economic Affairs, 65(2), 245–258. https://doi.org/10.46852/0424-2513.2.2020.20 DOI: https://doi.org/10.46852/0424-2513.2.2020.20

Downloads

Published

2024-02-29

How to Cite

Singh, D. K., & Singh, B. P. (2024). GST AND INDIAN FEDERALISM: NEGOTIATING CENTRAL AUTHORITY AND STATE AUTONOMY. ShodhKosh: Journal of Visual and Performing Arts, 5(2), 1478–1483. https://doi.org/10.29121/shodhkosh.v5.i2.2024.6229