BEYOND COASE: INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE AND THE CONFLICT OVER SAND MINING IN THE THOUBAL RIVER, MANIPUR

Abstract [English]

The Thoubal River in Manipur, Northeast India, has long supported livelihoods and ecosystem services through its various ecosystem services such as provisioning, cultural as well as regulatory services. However, recent hydrological disruptions, enhanced by the construction of the Mapithel(Thoubal Multipurpose Project) Dam and the increase in the demand for construction materials, have intensified mechanized sand mining in the river's upstream sections. This has led to ecological degradation and triggered a growing conflict with downstream communities. This paper examines whether the Coase Theorem can explain or resolve this conflict. This theorem assumes that clearly defined property rights and low transaction costs can resolve externalities through private bargaining. Drawing on field interviews, policy analysis, and stakeholder mapping, the study finds that key Coasean conditions such as ownership clarity, enforceability, and low-cost bargaining are absent due to institutional failure, elite capture, and land ownership ambiguities. The paper argues that the informal privatization of a public resource in a context of weak governance invalidates the Coasean framework. It proposes a multi-stakeholder river basin management framework, ecological taxation, and livelihood transition policies as viable alternatives for conflict resolution and sustainable river governance. This case contributes to broader debates on common-pool resource management, environmental justice, and institutional design in the Global South.