A STUDY ON BRENTANO’S CONCEPT OF INTENTIONALITY

Laishram Omorjit Singh; L. Bishwanath Sharma

doi:10.29121/shodhkosh.v5.i3.2024.4947

Authors

Laishram Omorjit Singh Research Scholar, Department of Philosophy, Manipur University, Canchipur, Imphal, India
L. Bishwanath Sharma Professor, Department of Philosophy, Manipur University, Canchipur, Imphal, India

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.29121/shodhkosh.v5.i3.2024.4947

Keywords:

Descriptive Psychology, Intentionality, Intentio, Intentional Object, Empirical Psychology

Abstract [English]

In his famous book, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint’, Franz Brentano recovers intentionality as an essential foundation of empirical psychology known as descriptive psychology. For him, intentionality is the property of consciousness or mind which is the modern equivalent of the Scholastic term, intentio’ whereby it refers to or intends an object. In the enquiry on Brentano’s concept of intentionality, the notion of the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object undoubtedly occupies the central position. The expression, ‘inexistence’ which is his translation of the medieval Scholastic term, ‘inesse’ meaning ‘being-in’ or ‘indwelling’ refers to the inherence of property in a substance, e.g., the manner in which redness resides in the red rose or knowledge resides in the knower. Here, the concept, in’ does not have spatial connotation but it expresses dependence. Thus, the intentional object can be regarded as the real object as thought by the mind but not as a special object with inexistence. He, no doubt, enriches the concept of intentionality by providing a clear-cut criterion for distinguishing thought from non-thought, mind from non-mind, the philosophical from the non-phylosophical on the basis of an intelligible distinction between the intentional and non-intentional. In a nutshell, the term intentionality in a philosophical sense indicates an act’s being directed at an object. The aim of the paper is to examine Brentano’s concept of intentionality as propounded in ‘Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint’.

References

De Boer, Th. (1978). The Developm ent of Husserl's Thought, trans. Theodore Plantinga. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9691-5

Brentano, F. (1973). Psychology from an Impirical Standpoint, trans. Linda McAlester. London: Routledge.

Crane, T. (2017). Brentano in Intentionality. In U. Kriegel, Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. New York and London: Routledge. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315776460-5

Jacquette, D. (2004). Brentano's Concept of Intentionality. In D. Jacquette, The Cambridge Companion to Brentano. Cambridge: Cambridge University. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521809800

McAlister, L. (2004). Brentano's Epistemology. In D. Jacquette, The Cambridge Companion to Brentano. Cambridge: Cambridge University. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521809800.007

Moran, D. (2000). Introduction to Phenomenology. London and New York: Routledge.

Rollinger, R. (1999). Husserl's Position in the School of Brentano. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1808-0

Simon, P. (2012). Franz Brentano. In S. L. Overgaard, The Routledge Companion to Phenomenology. Oxon: Routledge.

Smith, B. (1994). Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of Franz Brentano. La Salle, I L: Open Court.

Spiegelberg, H. (1994). The Phenomenological Movement: a Historical Introduction. Dordrecht: Kluwer A cademic Publishers. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-7491-3_1

Tassone, B. (2012). Franz Brentano's Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. London: Palgrave Macmillan. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137029225_8

William, B. (1999). Act, Content and Object. In L. a. Albertazzi, School of Franz Brentano (p. 250). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publisher.