FEDERAL STRUCTURE OF GOVERNANCE IN INDIA: A REVIEW
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.29121/shodhkosh.v5.i1.2024.4242Keywords:
Federalism, Constitution, DemocracyAbstract [English]
The federal structure of governance in India, as enshrined in the Constitution, represents a unique blend of centralized authority and decentralized administration, tailored to accommodate the country's vast diversity. This paper explores the intricacies of India's federal system, examining its evolution, characteristics, and the challenges it faces in balancing power between the central and state governments. The Indian federal framework is distinct in its "quasi-federal" nature, wherein the central government holds significant power, especially in areas of national importance, while state governments maintain autonomy in matters of regional and local significance. This duality is intended to promote unity while allowing regional diversity to flourish.
Historically, India's federal structure has been shaped by its colonial past, the need to maintain national integrity, and the desire to accommodate linguistic, cultural, and religious diversity. The Constitution provides for a division of powers through three lists—Union, State, and Concurrent—defining the jurisdiction of both levels of government. The central government retains substantial authority, particularly in financial matters and during emergencies, which has led to debates on the extent of federalism in practice.
This paper also addresses the challenges and tensions inherent in India's federal system. These include the financial dependence of states on the central government, disputes over resource allocation, and the role of the judiciary in resolving federal conflicts.
As India's federal structure has successfully managed the complexities of governing a diverse nation, it continues to evolve, facing new challenges in a rapidly changing political and economic landscape. The paper underscores the need for ongoing dialogue and reforms to strengthen federalism in India, ensuring it remains responsive to the aspirations of all its regions and people.
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