Article Type: Research Article Article Citation: Raed Awashreh. (2020). PALESTINIAN
PERSPECTIVES ON FOREIGN AID. International Journal of Research -GRANTHAALAYAH, 8(6),
236-251. https://doi.org/10.29121/granthaalayah.v8.i6.2020.539 Received Date: 10 May 2020 Accepted Date: 30 June 2020 Keywords: Palestinian NGOs Israel Occupation Foreign Aid Political Aid Although Palestinian non-government organizations (NGOs) are hiring some employees and supply money to local market, this article argues that NGOs are moving within the political place of donor’s agenda meaning western governments’ agenda. The historical trends in funding NGOs in the occupied Palestinian territory essentially aim at ending the Palestinian struggle against occupation and encouraging Palestinian masses and institutions to de-politize their agendas and forsake their national goals. In other words, foreign aid has no problem with the continuation of Israeli occupation or that Palestinians never have a (sovereign) state. All indications show that what paramount to donors since the start of peace process is keeping Israel safe and maintaining a limited Palestinian authority with no capacity to pose a threat against Israel. From the Palestinians side, disagreement on foreign aid among them based on funds source UN fund is acceptable, other different between USAID and European funds, other differentiate between government and nongovernmental funds.
1. INTRODUCTIONSeveral local NGOs
had been serving Palestinians since 1948 and later the number has increased due
needs that raises because of the occupation (Governance & Social
Development Resource Centre, 2010). NGOs uses the slogan supporting the
Palestinian steadfastness on their lands, however, during eighties and nineties
up forward, a lot start questioning the role of Palestinian NGOs in defend
steadfastness and advancing national goals (Hamdan, 2010). it is important to
explore the extent to which NGOs adhere to them and the level of their
commitment to their advancement. At the outset, it is important to stress that
the Palestinian goals within the context of this research refer to those goals
determined by the Palestinians themselves rather than by Israel or Western
governments. To people, they represent the dreams to accomplish as the majority
of Palestinians believe that the two-state solution is a more suitable solution
for the Israeli- Palestinian conflict than the bi-national or Islamic state
alternatives (Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre, 2011). This article argues
that Palestinian NGOs are moving within the political position of donors’
agendas which are in this case the Western governments’ agenda. Prior to Madrid
and Oslo, donors, mainly Europeans, encouraged Palestinians to accept the
two-state solutions but today, their agendas seem to be centered on maintaining
the Israeli occupation and pushing the negotiations in the direction of pro-Israeli
solution even if it means a departure from the long held two-state solution. It argues that historical trends in funding NGOs in
the oPt essentially aim at ending the Palestinian struggle against occupation,
and encouraging Palestinian masses and institutions to de-politize their
agendas, and forsake their national goals. In other words, foreign aid has no
problem with the continuation of Israeli occupation or that Palestinians never
have a (sovereign) state. All indicators show that what paramount to donors
since the start of peace process is the security of Israel and the maintenance
of a limited Palestinian authority with no capacity to pose a threat against
Israel. This paper contains
four major sections. Section two represents literature review and shows that Camp David Accord between Egypt
and Israel has set the framework for foreign aid to Palestinians NGOs. Section
three explain the research methods that have used to develop this paper.
Section four represents the results and the discussion over field findings on
NGO funding. In addition, it presents the major trends and changes in NGO
funding over the past few decades, and last followed by a brief conclusion of the overview of NGO funding. 2.
AID
POLITICAL FRAMEWORK
The flow of foreign
aid to oPt correlated with Palestinian recognition of Israel’s right for
existence over the occupied Palestine in 1948 when in 1974, the PLO launched a
political initiative for the creation of a national authority over any land
they liberate or Israel withdraws from (Khaldi, 2008). In 1978 foreign funds
started to flow to oPt in the aftermath of Camp David Accord between Egypt and
Israeli was signed in the same year. It is widely
believed the process of NGO-zation (i.e. converting Palestinian mass
organizations into NGOs) had started in Camp David era. The first generation of
Palestinian NGOs appeared in this period due to multiple factors interacting
simultaneously: ·
Some
educated Palestinians and university graduates want to help the community via
NGOs (Samara, 2001), ·
An
understanding between the USA and Israel to allow the occupied Palestinians to
breath and improve their economic situation as a detour from the national
struggle (Nakhleh, 1989; Samara, 2001; Qassoum, 2004), ·
Inflow
of funds to the oPt via international organizations and government agencies
(Nakhleh, 1989), ·
Aid for civilian and humanitarian purposes benefited
the Israeli economy because of the dependency of Palestinian economy on the
occupation (Samara, 2000), ·
Fateh encouraged Palestinians in the oPt to create their associations as a
way of steadfastness and self-help. The first wave of
donor funds was directed to relief through several American and INGOs and
chapters (Nakhleh, 1989) to reduce the damage of occupation. It was followed by
a wave of university scholarships in order to create a group of co-opted
educated individuals for the promotion of peace and non-violent struggle
strategies (Qassoum, 2004). On one hand, the US understood that poverty and
refugee tents under military occupation do not leave open choices other than
carrying guns to fight occupation, on the other hands, rich families were
building houses and pursuing their personal interests, both of which are not
the right motive behind engaging in national struggle. Some activists
reject the correlation between NGOs, Camp David and available funding
reflecting that NGOs (a) rejected the agreement and the notion of limited
autonomy it proposed to Palestinians, and (b) Palestinian political factions
encouraged NGO creation push community involvement forward as a way of
resisting the occupation. What is missing here, the catalyst effect the
historical changes had on NGO creation and the role played by the Joint
Palestinian-Jordanian Committee. Such view also neglects donors and NGOs’ focus
on service delivery did nothing to promote national goals (Qassoum, 2004;
Samara, 2001). Worse, NGOs hardily acknowledge the fact that Oslo Accords
generated funding opportunities in the 1990s all based on the incarnation of
principles of Camp David Accord. It can also be said that NGOs were prepared by
donors to play a role in forming the PA (Abdaulhadi, 2004). Many NGO figures
experts took part in the negotiation process (through participation in
technical committees) or joined the many PA institutions. Or that the three
sectors; PA, private sector, and NGOs, in fact cooperate for the
de-politicization of Palestinian society. The overarching objective is to
restructure the geographical sphere in line with the Israeli interest of
sustained control of oPt and subordination of its economy (Hamdan, 2010). The issue of foreign
funding to oPt is viewed from different perspectives. A very popular
perspective among Palestinian NGOs looks at aid as a legal right for an
occupied nation provided for by various UN decisions and declarations (UN
General Assembly Resolution NO 128/41 cited in Hamdan, 2010) pertinent to the
Palestinian question (Qazzaz cited in PJW, 2008). The second perspective refers to guilty conscience in which donors
on behalf of their Western governments are trying to compensate Palestinians
for bringing the Israeli occupation and causing a lot of sufferings. The third
view believes that aid is an obligation resulting from the negotiation process
since Madrid and Oslo Accords. The ‘legal’
perspective assumes an implausible scenario of foreign aid being enforced by
the international law while the ‘guilty’ and ‘compensatory’ perspectives
depoliticize aid and present it in more positive terms. Nevertheless, all three
perspectives help in understanding why financial support is usually
accompanied, or driven, by donors’ agendas and to the political, social and
economic changes that foreign funding brings in the oPt. Two alternative views
link foreign funding to Neo-liberal agenda and the restructure the oPt through
funding. In other words, foreign aid strives politically, ideologically and
culturally to transform the Palestinian society to become more receptive of and
indefinitely tolerate the Israeli occupation (Samara, 2001; Qassoum, 2004;
Hamdan, 2010; Sebieh, 2011). A benign version of this hypothesis sees donor
funding working to maintain peace and non-violence as well as support the peace
process through ensuring that PA remains a ‘non-viable’ entity without international
financial assistance. 3.
RESEARCH
METHODS
To investigate on
this issue, a combination of qualitative and quantitative methodology has
adopted, using primary and secondary data over NGOs in the West Bank to build a
theory from the field. Five main data collection
instruments uses here: (1) a structured six-page survey was distributed to a pre-selected sample of forty
organizations. 40 adult respondents selected from NGOs across the West Bank. A perception survey on the opinions and
positions of 100 NGO staff members carried out using a one-page structured
survey. (2) Face to face interviews
with 53 interviewees representing a wide range of NGOs, relevant PA
institutions, local organizations, donors, and civil society activists and
experts. Each semi-structure interview took 1/2 -2 hours to complete,
especially if the interviewee has many professional capacities or formal roles
in the community (i.e. university professors, mayors, and NGO board members,
etc. (3) Three focus group discussions for NGOs members and
activists in the West Bank. The researcher called selected organizations to
explain the purpose and nature of the research and the issues to be addressed
in the focus groups, and agree on suitable day, time, place, and other
logistical issues[1].
The three- hour focus groups were held: one in district of Tulkarem,
El-Kafreyat rural areas, and two more held in the town of Beit Rima and
Al-Amari Refugee camp in Ramallah district. The second focus group in Ramallah
had participants selected from refugee camps in Ramallah, Jerusalem and Jericho
districts. (4) Three case studies
were undertaken on a number of urban and rural-based CBOs and NGOs in the
target districts. The case studies were developed through interviews and
additional focus groups discussions. The target localities were chosen because
of the researcher’s familiarity with their social contexts and for their
physical proximity conducive to frequent field visits for data collection. (5)
In addition, six exploratory meetings
with key informants and experts were held to solicit their views and ideas on
the issues under investigation. They are located in the city of Ramallah and
approached on their expertise and ability of cooperation. 4.
RESULTS
AND DISCUSSION
The data below constructed
from the field supported by secondary data sources. Here are the results and
discussion over findings: 4.1. SOURCE OF FUNDING
During personal
interviews and the NGOs organizational survey, the study investigated NGOs
financial status through a series of questions without asking respondents to
specify the amount of received donor funding. In this section, I will first present
the financial findings of this study in comparison to results already
documented in the literature on Palestinian NGOs. These studies indicated that
since 1993 the European states share by far been the largest aid contributor to
the PA and NGOs in the oPt. “The Arab League states have also been substantial
donors, notably through budgetary support to the Palestinian National Authority
(PA) during the [ second] intifada” (More,2005, p.982). Today, it is estimated
that 78.3% total NGOs fund comes from external sources (DeVoir & Tartir
2009, p. 32). Table 1 below shows
that 50% of NGOs in the study sample has received fund from the European
Commission and about 37.5% receive support from other European countries. The
findings show that 87.5% of the sample has received funds from European origins
ranked as the first three important sources for the NGOs. By comparison, about
50% of respondent NGOs have access to American and Canadian funds but very few
actually rank them as the highest contributors. In other words, USA does
provide funding yet the Palestinian NGOs do not consider that as their main
funding source. This may reflect many factors: (a) the actual fluctuation in
USA funding, (b) NGOs find it difficult to accept US pre-award conditions, and
(c) NGOs inability to satisfy the very complex contractual obligations attached
to US funding. Table 1: Source of Foreign Aid to NGOs by No of NGOs & Donor Ranking
Survey sample: 40 NGOs. The “Respondents” column
represents the total number of NGOs that answered each question regardless of
their ranking of the source of donation. Furthermore, 75% of
the sample NGOs reported funding from INGO including UN agencies. About 45% of
NGOs had financial assistance from foreign governmental agencies compared to
37% from Arab countries. Asian and Islamic countries combined occupied the
fifth place as reported by 25% of sample NGOs (only 10 organizations). In terms
of local funding, Table 2 shows that it is not an important source to the
respondent NGOs although a small percentage does rely on local contribution as
a primary source of funding. Table 2: Source of Local Funding to NGOs
Survey sample: 40 NGOs. Total respondents in
indicates the number of NGOs that answered that particular question on funding
sources. Donor’s ranking indicates the number of NGOs that ranking each donor as the 1st, 2nd,
3rd, etc. with regard to each funding source. A breakdown of local
funding sources shows that the Palestinian private sector contributes to
supporting some activities of 52% of NGOs, although it is not the major source.
The private sector sometimes offers in-kind or cash donation upon NGOs request
or as part of the newly emerging ‘corporate social responsibility’ programs as
is the case with few banks, telecommunication firms and insurance companies. It
is very interesting to note that local communities and Palestinian expatriates
channel funds to 62% of NGOs that see such fund as important source in terms of
frequency rather than size. In addition, very few NGOs reported benefiting from
PA periodic support to help with the salaries, rent and other costs while
others reported additional funding from services revenues and membership fees. 4.2. ACCEPTABILITY OF AND ALTERNATIVES TO FOREIGN AIDPalestinian NGOs can
be judged as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ as a result of receiving funding from ‘good’ or ‘bad’
donors. Donors are judged from two considerations: (1) their position from
Palestinian national rights and (2) their interference in determining public
priorities. Foreign aid is
widely acknowledged as a ‘double-edged sword’ (
Although part of NGOs funds is wasted on hotels and publications, it is
money channeled into the Palestinian market in the form of workers’ salaries,
and contracts with service sector (GI., conversation, 2 December). But aid has
many negative manifestations that outweigh the positives: distortion of local
salaries, the creation of new elite of NGO careerists, co-optation of middle
class intelligentsia, and the substitution of voluntarism by paid employment,
to mention but a few (Samara, 2001; Qassoum, 2004; Hamoudah, 2011). Almost in
every occasion, NGO leaders claim their organizations reject conditional funds
and accuse others of following foreign and donor- driven agenda, regardless if
the latter’s funding originate from governmental or non-governmental agencies
(SA., interview, 1 February; A.K., interview, 17 March; A.J., interview, 27
March; ZN., interview, 15 February; KB., interview, 15 March; E.A., interview,
7 April). Apparently, the study findings revealed lack of agreement among NGO
leaders on the acceptability or
otherwise of donor funding. To them, all funding comes
with various forms of conditions even donors’ support to the PA, but there are
funds more acceptable than others such as support given by Arab and
Islamic countries and solidarity groups in Southern America and Europe (Hamdan,
2010) although such support is much
more limited than that provided by Western sources (E.A., interview, 7
April; KB., interview, 15 March; ZN.,
interview, 15 February). Arab and Islamic funds are ‘cleaner’ because they are
not attached to social transformation and de-politicization agendas espoused by
the neo-liberal Western countries and most international donor agencies.
Another category is labelled ‘ok donors’ that support Palestinian NGOs directly
managed by an intermediate Palestinian organization i.e. the Welfare
Association (Hamdan, 2010). Mirroring disagreement on the ultimate objective of foreign aid,
Palestinian NGOs differ on whether or not the Palestinians, including PA and
NGOs, should accept foreign funding. On one hand, some NGOs favour boycotting foreign aid because donors’ conditions and
priorities are irrelevant to the actual needs of the Palestinian public (E.A.,
interview, 7 April). This is the view mostly expressed by traditional,
charitable associations such as Ena’ash
El-Usra in Ramallah and El-Bir
El-khayerieh in Nablus that depend entirely on local and Arab resources
instead of foreign aid (EA, interview, 7 April; YH, communication, 3 February). On the other hand, the
majority of NGO leaders, managers, and staff oppose the boycott on the ground
that it is a legitimate assistance used to serve the Palestinian public and
without which NGOs will be forced to shut down their programs and services
(TI., interview, 15 march; I.B., interview, 16 February; M.B., interview, 30
March). Only a few interviewees stated that foreign political goals, or foreign
agendas, do not always go against the public or national agenda (GI.,
conversation, 2 December) or went farther to deny that humanitarian assistance
conceals foreign political interests and goals (ET., interview, 15 March). The common view among the political parties and the interviewed NGO
leaders stresses the importance
of foreign funding for their organizations and the oPt generally (Jabber,
2011). Despite a tendency to agree on
the political motivation, there was less agreement on the negative impact of aid
and the necessity to boycott it for both reasons (i.e. political motivation and
negative impact). In fact, the position of this or that individual from foreign
aid depends on where s/he stands from the aid map and the personal benefit
derived from this aid. Those who are generally in favour of continued foreign
assistance are top level managers interested in maintaining NGOs services and
staff. Some argued that neither NGOs nor PA are capable of survival without
foreign aid so governmental officials and NGOs cannot reject foreign aid when
the PA is the biggest ‘NGO’ in the donor funding business (KB., interview, 15
March; ER., interview, 5 December; Hamodah, 2010; Hamadan, 2010). Unlike
donor-dependent NGOs, political parties favour a boycott because they do not
seem to be directly[2]
affected by foreign aid since their budgets, and the PLO budget, are determined
by the PA budget itself (Jabber, 2011). Regardless of this
major difference, the main objection is directed to funding practices rather
than to funding per se. Palestinian political and NGO leaderships direct their
criticism to the strings attached to funding and decisions-making in fund
management. NGOs leaders feel there is an urgent need for re-structuring
donor-NGO relations in a way that enables the Palestinian NGOs, not donors, to
determine priorities, project and actual interventions as an alternative to the
current methods in which donors use their funding power as a leverage for
setting NGOs agendas and plans (JA., interview, 31 March; Kh., interview, 26
April; KB., interview, 15 March; M.B., interview, 30 March). A third position is
slightly pragmatic in the distinction it makes between donors. This view is
more in favour of receiving funds from solidarity groups but not from source
classified as ‘conditional donor funding’ such as the USAID (KB., interview, 15
March; and M.B., interview, 30 March,). NGOs boycott, or claim to boycott USA
fund on the ground of the anti-terrorism certificate, vetting, and many other
procedures that treat Palestinian NGOs as supportive of ‘terrorists’.
Therefore, many NGOs under the PNGO umbrella and other left-leaning NGOs label
US funding as bribery (AL., interview, 15 December). In comparison, Fateh affiliated NGOs accept funds and
all of its conditions dictated by the US and many other donor agencies or
international organizations (SA., interview, 1
February). The left-leaning NGOs are more content with dependence on
pro-Palestinian ‘solidarity funds’ from European countries, the UN and other
international agencies (Survey and interview results). As an extension of this
logic, Palestinian NGOs are good or bad depending on how good or bad are their
donors in the public’s eyes. The focus groups and
one-to-one interviews echoed all of these sentiments. The absolute rejectionist stance argues that foreign aid is harmful and unacceptable as a substitute for
‘national freedom’ (NR, interview, 21 March). New Palestinian generations are
capable of living on their own “just like our parents lived without foreign
aid” (SM., interview, 18 December). Some NGOs called for a unified position
among all NGOs to boycott foreign aid in preference for promotion of
‘inter-Palestinian solidarity’ and reliance on local resources and social
capital. As the interviews progressed, some changed their opinions from utter
rejection of funding more towards reforming fund management practices from both
donors and recipient NGOs (SM., interview 18 December; NR., interview, 21
March). Only a few maintained convictions in local resources shift although
they admitted that such resources are meagre and their organizations have no
strategic vision and plans to increase local funding or come up with
sustainable alternatives to foreign aid. Thus the only substitute for blanket
acceptance of funding seems to rest on a combination of three strategies: a)
NGOs making a distinction between good versus bad funding (KB., interview, 15
March; M.B., interview, 30 March), b) NGOs shifting to Arab or Palestinian
funding such as the funds managed by the Welfare Association (KB., interview, 15
March; Hamdan, 2010), and c) NGOs building an egg nest of funding (i.e.
endowments) to ensure flexibility and continuity in case donors’ interests
contradict the NGO’s or that the donor interferes in NGO agenda and programs
(KB., interview, 15 March; M.H., interview, 20 February). From all of the
above, it seems that foreign funding is a matter not only of personal
perspective but also of life style too. To say no to foreign funding implies
that Palestinians need to forsake their style of consumption (cars, private
schooling, clothing, food, travelling, mobile phones and all luxuries). Saying
yes means moving along with the ‘globalized’ way of life style which is
possible if there is will, trust, beliefs and awareness. To quote NR, “all
Palestinian institutions and groups must collectively cut foreign aid. Not only
few organizations, but all of us should do that when just a few do that,
nothing will change” (NR., interview, 12 March). NR himself struggles with his
position towards foreign aid. He faces a dilemma that many NGO leaders and
mayors face: “As a university
professor I used to freely criticize and speak out against foreign aid. As a
mayor, not any more. I need funds to do some projects to the town. People look
at and watch what I have done so far for them. The town has many needs, and my
job is to secure funds. European or American funds are all the same. USA
agencies are working with us on organizational – institutional development and
infrastructure projects too” (NR., interview, 12 March). In other words, it
is far easier to condemn than suggest ‘appropriate’ alternatives to the
potentially damaging foreign aid given to mitigate public resistance and the
occupation’s negative impact on the occupied people. Like other NGO leaders,
the stance taken by mayors and public officials depend on the ability of their
institutions to serve the public but they also want to showcase accomplishments
and fulfill the promises made during election campaigns. What is missing now is
people’s internal solidarity and social capital allowing dependence on limited
available resources (KB, interview, 15 March; SM., interview, 18 December). To
call for a ‘simpler life’ may seem like a call for a relapse to the ‘dark age’
without the advanced technology in the ‘global village’ era. But if this is the
public’s choice, others should respect it, including the NGOs and donors. In theory, NGOs can
negotiate with donors the priorities and strategies of their cooperation which
implies that NGOs can be design makers at the same footing with their donors.
In reality, NGOs leaders are less interested in, motivated, or have the power
to force such a change because their personal and organizational agendas and
interests are all at stake. Although NGOs leaders seem in agreement on the need
to change foreign aid management, they shy away from the outright rejection of
foreign funding. This objective has least chances of being achievable unless
the Palestinians NGO develops certain types of homogeneity and a unified agenda
for the third sector. 4.3. CHANGES IN NGO FUNDING TRENDSIt is an established
truism that financial support to Palestinian NGOs is extended by foreign
governments, international NGOs, Arab states, UN agencies, charities, and
foundations and sometimes political parties and solidarity groups worldwide. In
addition; there are local resources such as the PA, private companies, Zakat money, local donations, and
Palestinian expatriate communities. About 62% of total funding to Palestinian
NGOs comes through international NGOs and major donors in European Union, USA,
UK, France, Spain, Switzerland delivered either and 38% from governmental
agencies (DeVoir & Tartir, 2009). It is worth noting that since Oslo
Accords, about 54% of foreign aid to the Palestinian territories had come from
European Union (Hamdan, 2010, p. 52). Table 3 below
reveals interesting variations in donors’ attitude to the PA and Palestinian
NGOs. Overall, there is a clear preference for channeling funding through the
PA except when the PA falls out of the donors’ favor. Overall, NGOs share,
according to the above figures, has not exceeded 19.5% in its highest values in
2005. This year marked the second national elections in the oPt since 1994: two
rounds of local council elections, the presidential elections and the
Legislative Council election in early 2006. In 2005, NGOs received almost three
times the amount received in 2003-4 when NGO total funding decreased by 50%,
from 103 million in 2002 to a mere 57 million in 2004. The year 2006 also
marked another period of increased PA funding and decreased donor support to
NGOs. By 2008[3],
NGOs funding slightly improved although PA support were at an unprecedented
level. In comparison to 2005 level, NGOs received in 2008 only 40 million more
than its share in 2005 while PA funding increased by more than 2.15 billion
from the 2005 level. Table 3: % of
Annual Increase in NGO funding of Total Foreign Aid to oPt
Source: (DeVoir & Tartir, 2009) The abundance of
funds indicated in the above table may paint a distorted image. Firstly,
funding fluctuates considerably in accordance with political developments or
lack thereof. For example, most Western, non-governmental agencies extended
large-scale funding immediately after Madrid and Oslo Accord (HI., interview, 9
April). The USA, for example, had offered USD 3.3 billion since 1994, channeled
through the PA, USA private organizations and firms operating directly in the
oPt such as Chemonics, ANERA, Catholic Relief Services, CHF, IRD, and others
(Nakhleh, 2011). After 2000, US funds dropped to the lowest level then
increased slightly after 2004. In 2008, European funding comprised 70% of total
NGO funding while the USA funding recorded only 5% of funds which is a
significant decrease from its 12% in 1999 (DeVoir & Tartir, 2009). The current study
also found many evidence of decreased NGO share of total oPt funding. Of the 40
organizations in the survey sample, 29 respondents identified and explained
changes in NGOs funding trends in the past few years. 24 NGOs noticed a
decrease in available funding and the other 5 organizations denied being
affected by a funding cut. For those NGOs with positive answers, fund reduction
comes as a result of the following reasons: Table 4: Perceptions of Respondent NGOs of Reasons for Funding Change
24 out of 40 NGOs
responded to this question. For each statement the percentage is derived from
dividing the frequency over the number of total respondents (i.e. 24). Secondly, since
actual disbursement of foreign assistance to the oPt is way below the pledged
amounts, the ability of Palestinian NGOs to receive and transfer funds has been
limited in light of constant changes in donors’ policies and regulations. In
reality, NGOs do not have automatic, uninterrupted access to foreign funds but
they have to go into lengthy processes before funding, usually conditional, is
granted for a set of pre-approved interventions for a certain period of time.
For instance, US funding is mostly disbursed through the US Consulate and USAID
which have complex written guidelines and procedures for the provision and
management of foreign aid. It has also been said that the input provided by the
World Bank (EH, interview, 15 December; ER., interview, 15 December) and by the
American envoy, Dennis Ross, are essential to the determination of priority
sectors and strategies of foreign and USAID support to the oPt (Roys cited in
Sbieh, 2011). Currently, USAID subjects its applicants and grantees to a host
of vetting and oversight requirements, annual auditing, and legislative restrictions
“because of congressional concerns that, among other things, funds might be
diverted to Palestinian terrorist groups” (Zanotti, 2011, p. 1). Thirdly, most
funding is allocated to NGOs independent projects rather than support its
organizational mandate and main program/services. The study revealed that 18
NGOs, (about 45%) depend on project-based foreign funding compared to 22 NGOs
that receive program support and depend on local resources. Probably the EU
countries, unlike the US or the Arab donors, are the best known example of
donors who provide multi-year financial support as a consortium rather than
support independent projects, although there are signs that this policy is
changing more towards project support (Costantini et al., 2010). The number of ongoing projects per organization can range
between 3-6 projects, in order for the NGO to meet its running costs. It is
very rare for an organization to receive support from various donors
simultaneously, probably because of amount of labor-intensiveness required to
meet the donors’ reporting obligations on procurement, monitoring, evaluation,
and strategic planning. Table 5: Number of NGOs Donor-Funded Projects
Study sample: 40
NGOs in which 24 have donors fund projects, 18 are totally dependents on
donors-funded projects, and 16 with zero donors funds projects. Finally, the funding
figures do not guarantee NGOs financial sustainability. On one hand, about 85%
of surveyed NGOs, 34 out of 40 organizations, said they have not secured
funding for the next few years while only 6 NGOs (about 15%) said that their
donors have promised future financial support. On the other hand, donors’
funding allows for total or partial coverage of costs incurred by projects and
activities they support. It is very rare to find a donor agency willing to
invest in issues of long term sustainability of the NGO such as developing
organizational assets, such as buildings, equipment and capital investment
costs associated with services and income generation projects that relieve the
NGO from reliance on support of their donors. 4.4. WHO BENEFITS FROM FOREIGN AIDTable 4 depicted the
respondents’ ideas on the factors behind the recent decline in foreign funding
to the NGO sector. While it is difficult to come up with exact dollar estimates
provided to the NGOs, it is even more difficult a task to track the exact
beneficiaries of such funding. Even when studies attempt to do that, there are
two main reasons to question the accuracy of their estimates. It is ultimately
a matter of how researchers classify[4] the NGOs
and their activities. Very few organizations stick to one type of activity or
social group to serve. For example, a women’s NGO can be involved in a
multitude of legal, economic, educational, health, outreach and other services
benefiting not only women but their families, households and surrounding
communities. More importantly is that NGOs usually track their own expenditures
in terms of expenditure type rather than target groups. Unless the NGO is a
very specialized organisation, it is almost impossible for them to provide
researchers with accurate figures[5] on the
actual scope and impact of their activities. Having said that,
one should take NGO statistics and averages with a grain of salt. They are
better looked at as indicative of funding trends rather than the value of exact
support. For this reason, Figure 5.1 depicts the averages provided by two
research studies on NGO funding in post-Oslo period and the 13 years span
between 1995 up to the end of 2008. The historical
funding trend shows that health and education were the two sectors hit with
substantial shrinking in donor assistance. For example, health received in 2008
half the amount it received in the previous decade with a drop from 42% to
19.6% of total NGO funding. Education also suffered a deeper decline, from 23%
to just about 3% of total NGO funding, in the same years. This reduction may be
explained partly by the fact that most important donors include health and
education support in the direct bilateral assistance to the PA, which took over
the responsibility of administering both sectors directly after Oslo. It should
not be understood that both sectors developed to the point of not needing
substantial donor support. In fact, there are many signs of the exact opposite,
like long periods of general strikes in both sectors and deteriorating services
to suggest such kind of improvement. In contradiction to
the funding decline for health and education, some sectors had in 2008 received
double the funding amount obtained in 1999. For example, funding for social
services increased from 10.3% to 18.4% while human rights sector increased from
5.7% to 8.4% and youth increased from 1.6% to 4.0%. The share of women’s
organizations, by contrast, dropped from 7.7% in 1999 to a mere 3.2% in 2008. The table covers four periods for each sector
except few covers three periods as the data is not available from its original
source. Source: Averages for 1995-1998
figures are provided by Hanafi (1999) Averages for 1999-2008 are provided by Devoir & Tartir (2009) Devoir and Tartir
(2009) explain that this reduction in social services and women sector is the
results of donors’ desire to handover this responsibility to the PA while
encouraging NGOs to focus more on advocacy and policy dialogue. In other words
donors think that public policy, rather than service delivery, is the
appropriate role for the NGOs to play in the Palestinian context. Similarly
there was increase in infrastructure funding at the time of Israel’s policy of
uni-lateral disengagement from the Palestinians, including withdrawal from the
Gaza Strip and the building of the Separation Wall in the West Bank. The
funding enabled the opening of roads to serve Israeli settlers bypassing the
Palestinian communities and road networks. As for the growing importance of
human rights and youth funding after the Intifada II, some believe it aimed to
distract the youth from political engagement and encourage them seeking their
individual rather than the collective rights. The above section
concludes that Israel benefits directly from foreign funds allocated to the
Palestinians and donors’ attention always is to protect the state of Israel,
its security and political concerns. For the past ten years, donors have also
targeted youth believed to be the main actors in the Palestinian struggle
against occupation and the main revolutionary forces since 1930s (Qassoum,
2004). For example, the USAID funds major youth programs to help them build
their leadership skills and potentials as future leaders and promote conflict
resolution, non-violence, and entrepreneurship among the youth. M.B. expresses
deep concern over USAID involvement with Palestinian youth, especially with the
“youth shadow local councils” initiative that would create a loyal network of
youth supportive of US interests in the West Bank (M.B., interview, 30 March).
Some CBOs leaders share this sentiment as they see the youth shifting interests
form the national to the liberal, and from community voluntarism to sport, art
and other co-ed activities (MR., interview, 10 May). These changing
trends in certain sub-sectors can be read to either support or refute claims of
donor funding drastically changing to support non-Palestinian priorities. There
is a claim that donors push hard Western agendas with on women, youth and human
rights NGOs but the percentage of their funding hardly shows such an
overemphasis. The three sub-sectors combined received less than 15% of total
2008 funding when donors were preoccupied with stabilizing the PA after Hamas election win. Quite the contrary,
the finding seems to lend support to donor claims that their programs reflect
the actual needs in the oPt, whether or not they support the Israeli agendas.
If these percentages are indeed accurate and reliable, and that readers take
objective analytical perspectives, the data contradicts much of the arguments
about using NGOs to spread a neo-liberal agenda and the claim about the
proliferation in the number of women, youth and human rights NGOs. If both
claims are true, how come those NGOs survived the funding decrease? They do
prove however, that funding is used to mitigate the harmful measures of the
Israeli occupation in or against the oPt. For example, an analysis on donor
funding between 2000-2005 shows that NGOs and donors prioritized relief,
infrastructure, health and education at the time when Israel had militarily hit
hard on the PA and enforced the most damaging economic siege on the oPt during
the Second Intifada. The trend
reappeared after the Israeli 2008 war on Gaza and the subsequent ongoing siege
on the Gaza Strip. If anything, the figures seem to say that NGOs and their
donors react or respond to humanitarian and relief situations in the oPt. This
is the typical and historical mandate of most Palestinian organizations. How
did both fare in their ability to meet the actual need, one has to go back and
analyze the actual amount of relief funding received against the value of
issued humanitarian appeals and cost estimates for building and reconstruction.
In this study, the
survey has not asked respondent NGOs about the disaggregation of the size of
funding and expenditures by subsector. From previous work, NGOs rarely disclose
to researchers, or to the public, detailed information about their funding and
financial resources. For this reasons, the survey inquired about finances in
terms of organizational capacity asking for a total, rather than detailed,
estimate of NGOs budgets, expenditures and assets in the last two years only.
It was noticeable that 33 organizations answered that section while 7 NGOs
declined maybe because individual respondents do not have knowledge of the
financial affairs of their NGOs or because of their reluctance to disclose
financial information. The results are
provided in Table 6 which clearly shows that 17 NGOs (i.e. 42.5% of study
sample) have less than $100,000 of annual revenues. About 50% of the same
organizations have less than $100,000 in total assets. 9 NGOs have revenues and
5 NGOs own assets valued between $100,000 and half a million. Five NGOs
generate more than one million in revenues annually while four have total
assets worth more than 1 million 2010. These are the NGOs currently functioning
through 5 or more donor-funded projects. This is indicative of the small size
of most NGOs and funding programs generally in addition to NGOs weak financial
sustainability potentials and ability to attract substantial funding. It is
also indicative of the weak potential of NGOs to have any lasting impact
through their project-based, small-scale intermittent activities or services.
The 7 NGOs with revenues exceeding half a million may generate such amount not
from local resources or service delivery fees but more likely to have received
multi-year program support from one donor or received support from a consortium
of donors. For example of a block of several Scandinavian countries supporting
human and citizens right organizations that categorically decline US funding. Table 6: NGO Financial Capacities
Study sample: 40 NGOs, of which 33 responded
to the survey financial questions. Furthermore, this
research showed that the higher capacity group of NGOs are created during the
peace process era (1990-2000). About 5 organizations function with a budget of
half a million dollar or more. By contrast, the most recent organizations, created
after 2000, are the ones unluckiest in attracting huge amount of donor funding.
For whatever reason, almost 42% of NGOs in the study sample operate with less
$100,000 a year. This entails that when overhead costs are subtracted from the
meagre funds, organizations seem to be very local in coverage, operate through
volunteers rather than hired staff, and/or provide activities or services at a
small scale to leave a meaningful impact. Table 7: No of Respondent NGOs Budget Size and Establishment Date
Table 8 shows that
one third of NGOs are indeed of local CBO type functioning with less than
$100,000 per year at the district level, 25% or local level 42% compared to 13
organizations, less than one third, targeting the entire West Bank. As
expected, the higher the budget, the more capacity the NGO have in covering a
target area wider than its direct local community. In terms of beneficiary, the
survey found no correlation between the NGO budget size and a beneficiary
gender preference. It seems that disaggregation by gender is limited to the
very local organizations that shy away from co-ed activities and lean more
towards a specific gender. Usually, these are local organizations that are by
mandate either dedicated to women or to young men although the majority of
service organizations offer their services to the public regardless of the
beneficiaries’ gender. Table 8: No of Respondent NGOs Budget Size, Area Coverage & Gender Focus
Local coverage means an NGO operates in a
single community (individual city, village or refugee camp). Table 9 shows that
most of study sample has consisted of small service delivery NGOs or CBOs equal
to 35% of the sample. Although they comprise a lesser percentage of the sample
8 out of 40 organizations (about 20%) are advocacy NGOs receive larger funding
and/or have larger budgets than service organizations. Only two advocacy and
two service delivery organizations has 2010 budgets in excess of half a million
compared to 3 NGOs with mixed mandate. This trend may in fact reveal donors’
tendency to fund advocacy-focused NGOs or mixed-mandate ones through medium or
large–value projects than fund service-only organizations whose
activities/services are by default more specific and higher in costs that the
advocacy only counterparts. Table 9: No of respondent NGOs Budget size, Organization’s Type & Activities
Regardless of the
exact sources or recipients of funding, i.e. PA or NGOs, Israel does benefit
from foreign funding and any economic activities in the oPt. it was estimated
that “for every dollar produced in the occupied territory, 45 cents flows to
Israel.[6] The
remaining 55 cents is divided between expenditure on overcoming physical and administrative
Israeli barriers and being spent on the project” (UN cited in PNGO Network
Report, 2009, p. 33). The same applies on funding from the PLO, Arab or
Palestinians sources because “PLO support fund eventually benefited Israel
because of Palestinians’ dependence on Israeli economy. For this reason, Israel
allowed PLO funding into the West Bank and fought only the portion that aimed
at promoting national struggle activities” (TB., interviews, 20 February). The study also found
that donors prefer supporting urban NGOs rather than CBOs and/or encourage
NGO-ization in CBOs. About 50% of the surveyed sample has accounting software
available, and 38% to 43% has fully available written administrative and
financial systems and about 10-25 of the sample has partially these systems. In
addition, the investigation shows that organizations are more dependent on
staff and less on volunteers. Table 10: NGOs & Size of Full-Time Staff and Volunteers
*The BoD manages the NGO directly when it
lacks full-time employees or volunteers Donor–dependent NGOs
are more likely to become institutionalized in terms of developing formal
structure, paid professional staff, and systems (financial, administrative,
audit, etc.). These are a must in order for donors to consider large grants to
any organization. Capacity building initiatives also encourage the
consolidation of bureaucratic NGO features in grassroots organizations.[7]. The
more the NGOs turn to hired staff, the more successful donors are in their
‘co-optation’ strategy to separate their leaders and professionals from the
grassroots. Most leftist advocates of social justice, freedom, and equity are
employed by INGO and urban–based NGOs promoting neo-liberal agenda (Qassoum,
2004) which turned them into careerists in the hunt for big salaries and more
advanced career potentials in the oPt or beyond (A.B., interview, 2 March;
Najem et. al, 2006). This professionalization and funding inflow have killed
the spirit of voluntary work and turned activists into ‘an army of staff’ whose
only “contribution to the national cause” is reporting to donors and advocating
donor’s approaches to development and empowerment of local communities (HN.,
interview, 17 March). 4.5. NGO FUNDING AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATIONAs foreign funding
to NGOs increased, the actual levels of public participation in NGOs have
declined dramatically from the pre-Oslo years.
As NGOs and donors’ prioritized institutionalization, public
participation lost its importance especially when community activists joined
the rank of NGO management leaving a void difficult to fill by international
experts or INGO staff who could not substitute for the knowledge and relations
of their local counterparts. Local NGOs and their managers turned their
interest to fund-raising and higher salaries rather than to maintaining
people’s involvement with NGOs or make sure that their NGOs work according to
people’s needs (A.J., interview, 27 March; Sbieh, 2011). So, by turning the
voluntary into a full time paid job, donors take the blame for seducing locals
and killing the spirit of voluntary engagement among individuals and
communities alike (KH., interview, 26 April; ES., interview, 5 January,; SA.,
interview, 1 February; HA., interview,
10 February; RN., interview, 25 April; ER., interview, 15 December). For these reasons,
researchers, academic and politicians, regardless of their affiliation and
ideologies, equate ‘grassroots’ with ‘high public participation’ (Muhsin, 2010;
Ashrawi, 2009; Hamamai, 2000; Jad, 2000). For Qassoum (2004) the grassroots or
community organizations are ‘democratic popular development movements’
precisely due to mass public participation they allow. The public has not been
oblivious to the shift in NGOs priorities and their declining engagement with
the community to the point where they are reduced to service users (HI.,
interview, 9 April). The public is aware of NGOs foreign funding so they feel
entitled to free NGO services and to paid employment instead of volunteering
because NGOs receive money allocated to the Palestinian public. When the
community notices signs of NGOs financial means (i.e. cars, fancy offices,
frequent travel abroad), it become unfathomable to local residents to volunteer
their time or dabble in poverty while NGO people are getting richer. Presently NGO staffs
are most probably kept very occupied writing proposals and reports to recruit
more funds and respond to their donors’ requests for paper work (HN.,
interview, 17 March). To obtain funding, NGOs have to pass a ‘pre-award survey
or capacity assessment’ so the donor is insured its funds and projects are
managed according to its liking (DW., interview, 23 April). Almost always,
donors’ decision to fund hinges on the availability of programmatic and
management staff and systems at the potential recipient NGO (Sbieh, 2011). NGOs
capacity is further measured not by the size of their beneficiaries or
volunteers but by available funding and annual budgets (SA., interview, 1 February). In addition to
capacity assessment, strategic planning for NGO and PA ministries are largely
controlled by foreign donors. The PA sectoral plans, Hamdan (2010) argues,
often reflect Western criteria and judgments brought into the planning process
through international consultants. For example, World Bank sets the guidelines
for the use of its funding to PA and NGOs (EH., interview, 15 December; ER.,
interview, 15 December). It is also well known that the World Bank leads the PA
economic and fiscal planning processes that emphasize the preparation of plan
documents more than in involving the public in the process to ensure plans
responsiveness to actual needs (Sbieh, 2011). Donors’ promotion of
NGO advocacy over service delivery and relief (as advocated by Costantini et al.,
2011) means that donors view PA
as a permanent structure instead of being a transitional one limited to the
duration of the peace process. What ensues is that service delivery has
entirely become the responsibility of PA not NGOs and the PA becomes a permanent
self-rule for Palestinians or semi-state at best, thus negating the need to
continue struggle against occupation. Funding trends lend support to the above
and NGOs themselves pointed out the funding decline to health and relief
services while its increases for democracy, and governance, human rights, and
peace promotion (Abu Ghoush cited in Hamdan, 2010: 31). With a decline in or
disappearance of foreign aid, it is difficult to tell how this will affect the
relationship between the NGOs and the Palestinian public or how the NGOs
themselves would survive under the scenario no foreign funding. However,
absence of foreign aid will have a deep impact on people’s lives in the short
and long-term. People have to manage on their own resources for sure which is likely
to revive people’s interest in voluntarism and community work as was the case
before 1990s. 5. CONCLUSIONForeign aid to the
oPt comes from the European states and other donors who prefer to work with
more institutionalized Palestinian NGOs and occasionally CBOs. Foreign aid is a
double-edged sword; it fuels the local economic but it also derails NGOs
priorities, co-opts local elites, and de-politicizes grassroots. Thus, NGOs and
political factions adopt the concept of ‘don’t throw the baby with the water
bath’ in suggesting that foreign aid should be managed differently but not
rejected entirely. To influence foreign aid, NGOs need to build a united front
and adopt a unified agenda instead of serving the personal interests of their
leaders. While most Palestinian
NGOs believe in the Palestinian national goals, the findings point out that
NGOs sector believes that the PLO, PA and political parties, not NGOs, are
responsible for their attainment. When NGOs are involved in advocating
Palestinian national goals, they do so within the framework of PA’s agendas and
institutions, whether perceived as transitional or permanent self-rule
structure. The dynamics of politics and foreign aid played a significant role
in weakening NGOs adherence to national goals and public priorities. This is
also true for politically-affiliated NGOs that take advantage of civil society
arena as a substitute for direct and open engagement in politics and national
struggle. The findings show that less than one third of the surveyed NGOs actually work on top two priorities (poverty reduction and job creation) compared to less than 25% of NGOs responding to the third priority (education), and 10% focus on the fourth priority (health). Even when NGOs acknowledge the aforementioned public priorities, the surveyed NGOs could not agree on a set of priorities for the NGO sector because of their pre-occupation with short-term material needs. NGOs fragmentation is not a sign of vibrant civil society but rather a sign of the sector’s lack of a unified vision and real autonomy from foreign donors. SOURCES OF FUNDINGNone. CONFLICT OF INTERESTNone. ACKNOWLEDGMENTNone. REFERENCES[1] AbdulHadi, I. (2004). A broader vision of the role of Palestinian NGOs in the development process. Palestine: Bisan Centre for Research and Development. [2] Abusrour, A. (2009). Palestinian civil society: a time for action. 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USA: University of Illinois at Chicago. [28] Samara, A. (2001). Epidemic of globalization: ventures in world order, Arab nation And Zionism. California: Palestine Research and Publishing Foundation. [29] Sebieh, S. (2011). Problematic of Development Proponents: Between Mythical Application and Discourses’ Dogmatic Illustration. Palestine: Bisan Centre for Research and Development. [30] Zanotti, J. (2011). U.S. foreign aid to the Palestinians. Retrieved from http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organisation/166792.pdf. [31] Zanotti, J. (2011). U.S. foreign aid to the Palestinians. Retrieved from http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22967.pdf accessed on Nov 29 [1] Sometimes, I
spent the entire day was spent in one community doing interviewing and talking
to the residents as well as to gain people’s trust prior to data collection.
Some locations preferred meeting in the afternoon or in weekends and demanded
that I make arrangement for their transport. [2] Palestinian
political parties do receive an annual budget from the PA as they used to
receive support from the PLO prior to Oslo Accords. Some political cadres appear
on the payroll of various ministries even when they are actually staff of PLO-affiliated
agencies or working full time for political parties. [3] If the dollar
decrease in value is taken into consideration, the actual value of 2008 funding
is about 2.6 billion rather than 3.5 billion because the US dollar lost about
20% of its value between 2004-2008 while the PA budget is in Israeli Shekels. [4] For example, no NGOs present itself as ‘infrastructure’ organization.
Public infrastructure is the responsibility of national and local authorities,
not NGOs. Besides, infrastructure is included in every other subsector in MAS
classification. For example a youth club or a health organization will build
facilities but they are still considered service facilities rather than
infrastructure per se. It is also notable that MAS methodology leaves out
important sectors such as environment, agriculture, water, credit, housing,
think tanks and research canters. [5]To make statistics even less rigorous is that project expenditures often
have hidden elements that cannot be seen unless the researchers study the
budget and expenditures of each individual project. The amount of funding that
eventually funnels down to the beneficiaries is usually a very small percentage
of what is reported as total expenditures that also include administrative,
operational and transactional costs. Donors also include the costs of their
staff, experts, travel, contractors’ profit, etc. in the figures they provide
as the total value of foreign assistance provided to a specific organization
and/or sector. [6] Signs of economic dependency [7]
Examples: Palestinian Medical Relief Society
(PMRS), Palestinian Agriculture Relief Committee (PARC), Health Work Committees
(HWC) and many other organizations created by political parties as
grassroots but became professionalized NGOs upon the availability of donor
funding.
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