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TURKEY AND RUSSIA AS MAJOR PLAYERS IN THE BLACK SEA: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Nuri Demirel ^{*1}

^{*1} Department of Political Science and International Relations, V.I. Vernadsky Crimean Federal University, Simferopol, Russia



Abstract:

Currently, the Republic of Turkey plays a vital role in international processes taking place on the world stage. Since ancient times, at the crossroads of the paths between the world of East and West, the Republic of Turkey claims to have an excellent position in the relations of these regions with each other, as well as in their internal processes and events. The universal location between Europe and Asia makes Turkish foreign policy one of its main political issues, especially in the field of regional cooperation. Moreover, the changes in the world of recent decades, such as the collapse of the USSR, revolutions and military operations in eastern countries, the transition of Crimea to Russia, lead to the fact that Turkey pursued its foreign policy thoughtfully and actively, taking the most advantageous positions for itself.

An essential region for pursuing Turkish policy is the Black Sea region. The events of recent years have significantly affected him and the role that large states play in him, such as the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation. It also began to arouse great interest among states and regions of the Western world, such as the European Union. The changed geopolitical structure of the Black Sea region has led to the need for its members to determine their positions and areas of interaction in which they are ready to cooperate or, on the contrary, to oppose each other.

In this article, the author will examine the relations of the Turkish Republic and the Russian Federation in the Black Sea region and its importance. In this study, political relations, security, economy, energy, and security will be discussed. In the conclusion of the study, the current state of Turkey-Russia relations and assessments will be made about its future.

Keywords: Black Sea; Energy; Crimea; Russia; Turkish Foreign Policy.

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1. Introduction

The Black Sea region itself, in connection with issues of trade, energy, and national security, also began to play an essential role in international relations of global peace. This has become the reason for the active cooperation of Turkey with the new and old Black Sea states at different levels and in different areas of interaction, as well as attempts to establish itself as a regional leader.

For these reasons, the study of Turkish policy in the Black Sea region is especially relevant both for the Russian Federation and for the system of international relations of the modern world.

The Black Sea region plays an essential role in energy policy, being the southern export corridor for the supply of natural gas to Europe and Turkey. The first Black Sea pipeline was the Blue Stream, opened in 2005, which was intended for the supply of natural gas to the Republic of Turkey. The ability to supply natural gas to Europe through the Black Sea became most relevant after the change of power in Ukraine as a result of the internal political crisis of 2013-2014. Thus, it became apparent that the Black Sea region has acquired great importance not only for regional but also for global players in international relations.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the problems with connecting Crimea to Russia and the political relations of global actors in the region. The article will be completed by a chapter where the agreement and cooperation of the riparian countries in creating stability and confidence in the Black Sea region will be renewed. In this study, political relations, security, economy, and energy will be discussed. In the conclusion of the study, the current state of Turkey-Russia relations and assessments will be made about its future.

2. Turkey- Russia: Political Relations

Turks and Russians, the two leading powers of the Eurasian geography, have carried out "conflict-cooperation" based relations following the international order they have been in periodically since the time of Tsarist Russia and the Ottoman Empire. However, with the October 1917 Revolution under the leadership of Lenin, the establishment of the Soviet Union in place of Tsarist Russia was a cornerstone in relations. In this period, the Soviet Union disclosed secret agreements involving sharing the Ottoman withdrawal from the First World War. The Turkish War of Independence offering support very seriously close relations established between the Soviet Union and Parliamentary Government, after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 was developed further.

Vladimir Putin, former vice president and former KGB agent, won the presidential election in the Russian Federation (RF) in March 2000. In Turkey, on 3 November 2002, general elections were very surprised on 14 August 2001 under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, founded Justice and Development Party (AK Party) gained. Thanks to the harmony between the two leaders, the development of the scope of the relations between Ankara and Moscow had been deemed a priority, and steps had been taken towards this. Since 1990, the relationship is a fundamental player in energy followed by Moscow Nagorno-Karabakh, Central Asia, Georgia, Ukraine, Syria, and the Libya policy despite major crises arising from often experienced conflict with Ankara, in particular, Turkey's July 15, 2016, lived in Military Coup Initiative. The support provided by Russia has not been forgotten. In this process, despite the unwanted events such as the dropping of Syrian aircraft and the assassination of Russian Ambassador Andrey Karlov, strategic minds in both countries came into play and prevented the relations between the two bridgehead forces of the Eurasian geography. Following the establishment of a "Great Compromise" between the two countries, large-scale strategic projects such as the Turkish Stream Gas Pipeline, Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant and the S-400 Air Missile Defense System are remarkable in that they show the stage reached by pervasive relations, including the cultural dimension[1].

“Special for our cooperation with Russia, where we have shared common history and geography for centuries. We care about and improve our relationships. Especially in the last two years in our region addressing the developments, together with the principle of mutual trust and dialogue, and a common approach to stabilization, development of bilateral trade and tourism. We are developing. Russia, especially energy and trade, in the coming period. We will try to improve our bilateral relations with. On regional issues with Russia and we will continue our close coordination especially on the Syria issue” [2]. AK Party 2018 Election Declaration

“If I have to speak seriously, our common interests are huge. World two after getting out of the polar form, our relations started to change. Good direction there are developments. There are no commitments for blocks between our countries. Own we started to think about our interests. Interestingly, many wars took place in history. Today, we do not have a single problem that will create a conflict environment. There is no reason for competition” [3]. Vladimir Putin, August 2004

3. Turkey-Russia: Energy and Economy Relations In 1991-2020

Ankara has carried out since 1991 using natural gas by reducing its dependence on oil through a wide range of initiatives followed by a policy prioritizing. Cheaper than oil and usage area large-scale gas previously considered a rational investment. There has been an increase in usage. Our large provinces have moved towards gas heating, and our industry is focused mainly on gas production [4]. Energy is a dominant factor in relations between Ankara and Moscow. Primarily the year two thousand supplied with the increase in Turkey's hydrocarbon wealth led to rises in consumption. Turkey said energy lack of resources has resulted in foreign dependency. Dependence on oil imports to Turkey's case at stake proportionally, while 93.6 percent. This dependency ratio in natural gas is around 99.2 percent. Turkey is considering the distribution of the oil it imports by its suppliers. Russia takes second place with eighteen percent. On the other hand, Turkey's gas imports in the list of supplier countries examined, Russia has with fifty-five percent. [5]. For example, according to the Energy Market Regulatory Authority's 2014 Natural Gas Sector Report, in 2014, gas imports were made in Russia with a share of 54.76 percent, while based on quantity, twenty-six billion cubic meters of the gas requirement of about fifty billion cubic meters.

It was supplied by Russia. In this regard, paid for the sale of gas to Moscow, the total amount was \$ 16.5 billion [6]. A sizeable net energy importer in the position of Turkey, which uses a total of one hundred and thirty million tons of oil equivalent in 2015, has imported three-quarters of primary energy. In 2015 according to the International Energy Agency statistics, in Turkey, it imported 34 million tons of coal thirty-three percent of the 25.1 million tons of crude oil to 12.4 percent, 22.9 percent and 23.6 million tons of petroleum products Fifty-five percent of 47.6 billion cubic meters of gas was supplied from Russia. In this manner, Turkey's share in total sales of Russian gas is three to ten percent level. 2015 As of year to Turkey by Russian energy giant Gazprom 27.02 billion cubic meters of gas was exported, and Ankara maintained its second-largest buyer position in Moscow's gas exports after Berlin. Promise the amount subject to 24.5 billion cubic meters in 2016, but the future Twenty-five billion by 2022, with a small increase in periods it is envisaged to be fixed at the level of cubic meters. [7].

The opening ceremony of the Turkish Stream Natural Gas Pipeline took place on January 8, 2020. The event, Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin, the Republic of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan Prime Minister Recep Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borissov, Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak, the Republic of Turkey Energy and Natural Resources Minister Fatih Dönmez and Gazprom Chairman Alexei Miller joined. Gazprom Vice Chairman and CEO of Turkish Stream Oleg Aksyutin and BOTAŞ Chairman and General Manager Burhan Özcan also participated in the event via satellite connections.

Turkish Stream Black Sea built into the base; the natural gas transmission network connects Russia and Turkey. The pipeline consists of two lines with a total capacity of 31.5 billion cubic meters. The first line, while the supply of natural gas to Turkey, while the second line will carry the gas to Turkey and South and Southeast European countries through the territory. The construction of the offshore gas pipeline, which lasted fifteen months, was completed even before it was planned in November 2018. The building, located near the terminal Purchases Kiyiköy resort in Turkey, completed construction in 2019.

Turkish Stream starts at the Russkaya Compressor Station with a capacity of 224 MW, located in the Anapa region, which is part of the Russian United Natural Gas Transmission System. The facility to purchase natural gas terminal on the coast of Turkey to transport over 930 kilometers along two lines provide the necessary pressure. In Turkish Stream, a technologically unique project, pipes with a diameter of 813 mm, installed for the first time in the world at a depth of 2200 meters. The most advanced safety standards, including environmental safety, have been implemented at all stages of the Turkish Stream project. The same standards will be applied during the operation phase, and a continuous environmental monitoring program will be implemented.

Gazprom Chairman Aleksey Miller said, “The commissioning of Turkish Stream is a historical event. First, it needs Russian natural gas exports to Turkey following the addition of the Turkish Stream capacity of the Blue Stream, all of which can be supplied directly without the need for any transit routes. Second, a new and reliable route has been provided for the transmission of Russian natural gas to Europe through the pipeline.

All of this, undoubtedly, will take our cooperation with our Turkish and European trading partners to a higher level and contribute to increasing the energy security of the region” [8].

The Turkish Akkuyu nuclear power plant (NPP) project has restarted after the Turkish Government signed a deal with the Russian Government. The intergovernmental cooperation agreement on the NPP was ratified in 2010.

Delayed in 1999 and canceled in 2000, the project initially intended to produce 3,000MW. The first unit was commissioned in 2006 and the second in December 2007.

The first unit is expected to achieve its first criticality in the second half of 2019. The remaining three units will come online in yearly intervals once Unit I begin commercial operations in 2020. The project is estimated to cost \$20bn and will be Turkey’s first nuclear power plant.

The foundation for the power plant's offshore hydraulic engineering structures (OHES) was laid in April 2015. The Cengiz Insaat Sanayi ve Ticaret JSC (joint-stock company) was awarded a \$394m contract to design and construct OHES.

The Akkuyu site is connected by sea, enabling the transportation of heavy machinery to the site. It is close to centers of electricity consumption such as Adana, Konya, Antalya, and Mersin. There is also a relatively lower population density in the region.

The first public hearing session on the project's environmental impact assessment (EIA) report was held in March 2012. Participants of the meeting, mainly representatives from Greenpeace, objected to the EIA, saying that it fails to address the environmental impacts of the plant.

The EIA report was approved by Turkey's Ministry of Environment and Urbanization in December 2014[9].

The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) came into existence as a unique and promising model of multilateral political and economic initiative with the signing of the Istanbul Summit Declaration and the Bosphorus Statement by the Heads of State and Government of the countries in the region, on 25 June 1992.

With the entry into force of its Charter on 1 May 1999, BSEC acquired international legal identity and was transformed into a full-fledged regional economic organization - the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation.

Aiming at fostering interaction and harmony among its members, as well as to ensure peace, stability, and prosperity, encouraging friendly and good-neighborly relations in the Black Sea region, today BSEC serves as a forum for cooperation in a wide range of areas for its 12 Member States: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Turkey, and Ukraine.

The BSEC Headquarters - the Permanent International Secretariat of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC PERMIS) was established in March 1994 in Istanbul.

Agriculture and agro-industry, banking and finance, combating organized crime, culture, customs matters, education, emergency assistance, energy, environmental protection, exchange of statistical data and economic information, healthcare and pharmaceuticals, information and communication technologies, institutional renewal and good governance, science and technology, SMEs, tourism, trade, and economic development and transport are among the main fields of cooperation within the framework of the Organization.

BSEC covers a geography encompassing the territories of the Black Sea littoral States, the Balkans, and the Caucasus with an area of nearly 20 million square kilometers. The BSEC region is located on two continents;

- BSEC represents a region of 335 million people, reaching an intra-BSEC trade volume of USD 187 billion annually;

- After the Persian Gulf region, it is the second-largest source of oil and natural gas along with its proven rich reserves of minerals, metals and other natural resources;
- It is becoming Europe's primary transport and energy transfer corridor [10].

“Strategic projects are carried out in the energy field. Turkey's first nuclear power plant Akkuyu is established. It is expected to be operational in 2023. Mr. President, on the anniversary of the founding of the Republic of Turkey requested that this project come into play. We invited Turkey to the country as a partner in 2019 exhibition. Of course, the subject of cultural and human contacts, immigrants are also the subject It was our title. Russian tourists to visit is the first in Turkey. Our meeting was very useful” Vladimir Putin, January 23, 2004[11].

“The upward trend in trade volume continues. Our trade volume has reached 26 billion dollars. Akkuyu, Turkish Stream projects are taking firm steps. 2019 will be a very special year, mutual culture in Turkey and Russia and we will organize tourism activities. Russians are among the first ranks of tourists to Turkey we have guests. Last year, 6 million Russian guests came to our country. Visa exemption will strengthen the fusion of our people much more” Recep Tayyip Erdogan, January 23, 2004[12].

4. Turkey-Russia: Security in the Black Sea Region

Regional tensions, natural resources, and geopolitical rivalries make the Black Sea region a strategic but sensitive area. In the absence of cooperative structures able to contain conflict, security threats ranging from interstate conflicts to illegal trafficking have emerged.

The region is politically, historically, and geographically divided. Today, three principal actors influence security policy options. Russia fears encirclement by the West, and thus works to counteract EU and US influence in the region. It seeks to maintain its role as the key regional actor and to block externally driven energy projects or military alliances. It wants to prevent NATO enlargement, as well as to suppress fundamentalist movements.

Black Sea countries themselves have diverse approaches to security. The tension driven by non-regional actors is a severe concern and produces a variety of responses. For instance, Turkey has pushed for a region-wide security initiative, possibly setting the stage for normalization of Russia's Role” [13].

NATO member Turkey, long-range with Russia in November 2016, announced that the S-400 air defense necessary to conduct interviews. On the other hand, the Minister of National Defense Fikri Işık, on 21 February 2017, but that Turkey has undoubtedly heard the need for a missile defense Turkey requires the urgent needs ultimately necessary for it. Noting that the purpose of the negotiations conducted with various countries, Turkey, in responding to the needs of Russia under present conditions mark the appropriate country. NATO and One of the leading experts on the subject about criticism from the USA about the evaluations made by Professor Mesut Hakkı Caşın: “SAMP / T compatible with NATO with S-400s that will be outside the NATO system, it is aimed to use air defense systems such as Patriot in different places in military terms. The technical capabilities of Patriot and S-400 are much more different, and it is useful to know all this. It is essential where the batteries will be used. Turkey has built jointly with Russia as we know it There

is the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant project. The nuclear power plant is a vital target for military strategy. So, this nuclear of the S-400 I think it will be instrumental in protecting the power plant.

Turkey's weather decided to buy S-400 missile defense system from Russia to meet their defense needs and is compatible with the NATO system with France and Italy SAMP / T missiles have agreed on joint development. Turkey is not the only NATO countries that use Russian missiles. Currently, there are Russian air defense systems in the inventories of the former Eastern Bloc countries and 7 NATO countries, including Greece. NATO Secretary-General In explanation of the decision made by the S-400 has stressed that the decision of Turkey. Some NATO countries voiced Turkey's S-400 air defense system in the event of starting to use some of NATO's secret air. The concern that Russia could capture defense information is unwarranted. Turkey revealed his opinion against all these allegations and these missiles. He made statements that he would not be tied to the NATO defense system but would be integrated into our national air defense system. The United States, we know that Turkey is disturbed by the S-400 missile systems to receive. If the USA If you want to sell missiles to Turkey for 10 years, these negotiations are going on, why I do that, why after Turkey decided to buy S-400 Patriot decided to sell? It is possible to use them all together, because Patriot operative state at the moment Turkey. It is possible to use missiles to be produced jointly with France and Italy at the same time. It depends on the threat you perceive. Turkey perceives a threat from much lower altitudes and partners; modern missile, class missiles that can come from seas, land borders, low and how it plans to meet missiles to be fired from mid-altitude depends on it. It is connected to satellite intelligence and our weather radar system. These three missile systems at the same time, of course, it can be used operatively. There's money in Turkey, Turkey also receives S400, SAMP / T also gets the Patriot. Why we say; Interventions to Iraq and especially the Syrian operations against air defense systems revealed the need. The technical capabilities of Patriot and S-400 are much more different, it is useful to know all this. In this respect, Turkey has decided to take this particular missile. Turkey's missile receiving, I think it will prejudice the NATO alliance "[14].

The next updated version of the AKP Program was prepared in 2011, before the parliamentary elections. As a new element, it contains information on the naval group "Blackseafor" and the operation "Black Sea Harmony," which indicates an increase in Turkey's attention to security issues in the Black Sea.

Another document relating to the foundations of Turkey's foreign policy in the Black Sea region is the annual report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey containing information on goals, means, and topical issues of foreign policy. The section "Maritime Security in the Black Sea" is devoted to the Black Sea region, which, as in the case of the 2011 AKP Program, addresses security issues in the region [15].

5. Conclusion

When the east of the Black Sea is considered as the Russian bloc west and the EU and the USA bloc, the most productive country in the geography is Turkey. The main reasons for this are; Turkey relies on the substances of the Montreux Straits Convention of Turkey in case the EU and the US stem from the political atmosphere in which they are heading, and head for the east and sham is not active but possible war. Also, it should be in dialogue with the countries which are

harmonized with the Black Sea by making events like KEI, BLACKSEAFOR, and KUH, which are led by Turkey more effectively. Thus, Turkey can be a balance between global and regional actors [16].

Summing up the general result, we note that the main subjects of the Black Sea foreign policy relations of Turkey are not only the states of the region but also such important international actors as the European Union. Due to contradictions in the interests of the EU and the Russian Federation, at present, the Republic of Turkey is forced to find a compromise policy and build a system of relations that best suits its interests as an independent entity and as an important regional actor interested in an effective security system of the Black Sea region.

In addition to the sphere of security, Turkey's relations affect the spheres of economy, energy, culture and ensure the dialogue of what is happening is not always easy, even in modern multipolar international realities. This, however, does not deprive Turkey of its resources and leadership ambitions in the Black Sea region.

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*Corresponding author.

E-mail address: demirel75@yahoo.com