# EXPLORING EDMUND HUSSERL'S HORIZON PHENOMENOLOGY: ANALYZING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HORIZON-FUSION WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY

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ABSTRACT

This study explores the concept of the "horizon" as articulated in Edmund Husserl's phenomenological philosophy and subsequently expanded by Hans-Georg Gadamer. It begins by investigating the etymological and philosophical origins of the term "horizon", tracing its evolution from classical to contemporary philosophical discourse. This research underscores how Husserl's notion of horizontal intentionality reconfigures our comprehension of perception and meaning, perceiving the horizon as both a boundary and an expansive realm of possibilities that frames every conscious act. Through the application of phenomenological reduction and the method of bracketing, this paper illustrates that the horizon is not a physical or fixed limit, but a dynamic and subjective structure that varies with one's perspective and awareness. Building upon this foundation, the article critically examines Gadamer's hermeneutical concept of the "fusion of horizons", which emphasises achieving mutual understanding by integrating historically and culturally specific viewpoints. This study evaluates this concept within the contexts of cross-cultural dialogue, philosophical interpretation, and the challenges posed by relativism. Drawing on thinkers, such as Derrida, Levinas, and E. D. Hirsch, it provides a detailed analysis of the tensions between universality and difference, particularly questioning whether true fusion can occur without the risk of assimilating or erasing otherness. By integrating insights from phenomenology and hermeneutics, this study highlights the enduring significance of the horizon in understanding consciousness, culture, and interpretation. It argues that the horizon is not merely a metaphysical boundary but a metaphor for the continuous, dialogical process of creating meaning. The horizon's flexibility and openness render it a crucial concept in fields such as philosophy, cultural studies, and interdisciplinary research. Ultimately, this study affirms the philosophical and practical importance of horizon fusion in fostering deeper intersubjective and intercultural understanding.

Keywords: Phenomenology, Horizon, Edmund Husserl, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Fusion of Horizons, Hermeneutics, Cross-Cultural Understanding, Philosophical Boundaries

1. INTRODUCTION

Within the domain of continental philosophy, the concept of the horizon transcends its role as a mere spatial metaphor, emerging as a pivotal philosophical construct that delineates the boundaries and conditions of human understanding. Deriving from the Greek term horizein, meaning "to delimit" or "to set bounds", the horizon traditionally represents the line where the earth and sky appear to converge. However, in phenomenological and hermeneutical discourse, particularly as articulated by Edmund Husserl and Hans-Georg Gadamer, the term assumes a more expansive significance, serving as the framework through which consciousness perceives and interprets phenomena (Geniusas, 2012). This article examines the intricate evolution of the horizon as a philosophical category, with an emphasis on Gadamer's notion of the fusion of horizons, which facilitates cross-perspectival understanding through dialogical engagement. The paper begins by elucidating the ordinary and etymological meanings of the term horizon, drawing from

classical and phenomenological sources, to establish its dual nature as both a boundary and a conditionally flexible limit. This foundation supports a philosophical exploration of how the horizon functions as a condition for perception and cognition. Husserl's phenomenology, particularly in his Ideas I and subsequent works, redefines the horizon as an intentional structure that encompasses every act of consciousness—an open field of meaning that permits phenomena to appear within a context (Husserl, 1913/1983). This contextual openness, which Geniusas (2012) identifies as central to horizontal intentionality, underscores the dynamic nature of understanding and the inexhaustibility of meaning. Building on Husserl's insights, Gadamer (1979) extends the concept to the realm of hermeneutics, proposing that understanding is always situated and historically conditioned. His concept of the fusion of horizons (Horizontverschmelzung) posits that a genuine interpretation involves an interaction between the interpreter's situated horizon and that of the text, tradition, or cultural other. This fusion does not imply seamless blending but rather a dialogical process that transforms both horizons in the act of understanding (Vilhauer, 2010). Consequently, Gadamer's theory holds significant implications for intercultural dialogue, literary interpretation, and ethics of understanding. However, the notion of horizon fusion is not without criticism. Scholars such as Hirsch (1967) contend that the idea risks either collapsing the difference into sameness or misrepresenting the other by projecting one's assumptions. Similarly, Derrida and other post-structuralists caution against the potential erasure of alterity in the pursuit of comprehension. These critiques suggest that while the fusion of horizons aims to foster mutual understanding, it must also remain sensitive to the irreducibility of differences and ethical limits of interpretation. This study investigates the philosophical trajectory of the horizon from Husserl to Gadamer, critically evaluating its conceptual robustness and applicability in hermeneutic and intercultural contexts. By engaging with both foundational texts and contemporary interpretations, this study underscores the horizon's enduring relevance as both a metaphor and methodological tool. Ultimately, it argues that despite its limitations, the horizon, especially in its fused form, remains indispensable for grappling with the complexities of meaning, identity, and understanding across time, culture, and context

2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Employing a conceptual, hermeneutic, and phenomenological framework, this study investigates the philosophical significance of the horizon and its development in the works of Gadamer and Husserl. The study is grounded in a comprehensive textual analysis and interpretative examination of seminal philosophical texts, including Husserl's "Ideas I" and "The Crisis of European Sciences," Gadamer's "Truth and Method," as well as pertinent works by Kant, Heidegger, and their critics. This methodology is deemed appropriate given the study's theoretical foundation and non-empirical nature. The objective of this research is to elucidate how the concept of horizon evolves from a perceptual boundary to a dynamic ontological framework that shapes all conscious and interpretative actions.

Furthermore, the study incorporates secondary literature, including works by Richard Bernstein, E. D. Hirsch, and Saulius Geniusas, to provide a comprehensive intellectual context and to identify areas of consensus and divergence in the philosophical discourse on the fusion of horizons. Gadamer's notion of "Horizontverschmelzung", or "fusion of horizons", is particularly highlighted as a hermeneutical tool for understanding interpretative interaction and cross-cultural communication. Various perspectives on horizon theory have been examined through comparative philosophical analyses, particularly in discussions on understanding, subjectivity, and alterity.

2.1. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

1) This study aims to examine the philosophical significance of the concept of "horizon" within Edmund Husserl's phenomenological framework, emphasizing its critical role in his philosophical system despite its limited coverage in contemporary scholarship.
2) It seeks to investigate Husserl's specific application of the term "horizon," distinguishing it from its common or metaphorical usage, to elucidate its fundamental role in shaping phenomenological concepts such as intentionality, perception, and the structure of consciousness.
3) The objective is to situate Husserl's explanation of the horizon within its appropriate conceptual context, thereby fostering a more profound and precise engagement among philosophers, students of philosophy, and phenomenological texts.
4) To investigate how Hans-Georg Gadamer advanced the concept of horizon fusion by integrating phenomenological research with hermeneutic philosophy, thereby responding to Husserl's horizon theory.

5) Analyse how the philosophical horizon model and its integration can provide a conceptual framework for understanding across linguistic, cultural, and historical boundaries.

6) By illustrating how horizon theory can support a dynamic and inclusive model of knowledge adaptable to diverse cultural interactions in today's interconnected world, we aim to contribute to contemporary discussions on intercultural communication and global philosophy.

3. THE MEANING OF THE HORIZON

As one may see, it is difficult to identify the well-known horizon we use in our everyday lives in phenomenal physical reality. It's an abstract concept that is difficult to describe adequately in the literal sense of the word (Novak, 1978: 81-82). The word horizon comes from the ancient Greek word ' Horizon,' which means a dividing circle, and is a derivative from the Greek verb 'horizon,' which means 'divide' or 'separate,' and derived from the Greek word 'oros,' which means 'landmark' or 'border.' According to the Oxford English Dictionary. The most widely used definition of the horizon is the line of demarcation of the section of the earth's surface accessible from a given point of view. In this line, the sky and the sea meet together to the perceiver. The border between the earth and the sky is the standard when we view the sea. The term horizon could denote the boundary or limit of every circle or sphere of view, cognition, and action, the limit or range of one's knowledge, experience, and interest, compared with the paradigm example of a visual horizon.

As a result of the investigation of this ordinary meaning of the word, two concepts emerge: first, a horizon is a border of some kind. Second, it is conditional on particular circumstances (Munitz, 1990: 150). The horizon is a line that represents the visual field's limit. From the start, it links to the phrase 'to delimit;' it is interpreted in a specific context that encompasses all delimitations. As a result, the phrase appears to be inextricably linked to boundaries (Geniusas, 2011:481-94). The horizon is like an unreachable line that science perceives as an optical illusion but that humans comprehend as the continuous limit of seeing—the ever-present and continually vanishing 'border' of sight (Ashcroft, 2001: 189). The word refers to the line where the earth and sky appear to intersect in everyday understanding. A horizon is not a fixed point in space. However, the horizon moves with us as we go, either receding in front of us or advancing behind us (Salzman and Lawler, 2008: 260). The term horizon pertains to what is acquainted, known, and imagined for a human if it is taken in the broader sense. The horizon becomes nearly identical to the cosmos as that which can be perceived, comprehended, or thought of by the individual, cultural, and societal in a particular point of existence or history, rather than just to focus in the limit of a vision (Graw and Schielke, 2012:14).

4. THE CONCEPT OF HORIZON

In Husserl's Phenomenology's The Origin of the Horizon, Saulius Genuisas carefully categorizes the term's common parlance into three thought-provoking perspectives. The horizon is the limit beyond the perceptual items that the human mind can perceive. It is a requirement for the phenomena inside its border to appear and block one's sense from being seen beyond the horizon for a short period — the phenomena at hand are appropriately interpreted for the sake of the study. The term's alternative meaning is 'to delimit,' and this delineation implies determination. Any matter takes on significance as a result of this determination. The horizon impacts how objects seem in the field of view, in the process there is a grasing one item more prominent than another. For instance, a sailboard closer to us will look more significant than one on the horizon; if the sky is dark blue, a red spinnaker will appear more vividly than a blue one. The horizon is positioned in front to give us a feeling of direction or orientation (Greenberg, 1994: 170).

According to Saulius Geniusas, the horizon is the line where the ocean or sea joins the sky. As a result, the horizon appears as a boundary, limiting our visual field. However, the restrictions in question must understand as an advantage for human knowledge. After all, a phenomenon that occurs beyond the horizon isn't a phenomenon. Additionally, we speak about the frontiers of knowledge, experience, and interests for a purpose of gaining knowledge. The term is broadly used to emphasize that the horizon as a necessary expression condition should not be limited to visual or perceptual phenomena. The horizon's etymological meaning supports our general use of the term. In ancient times, it was accommodated primarily in the context of astronomy. "The horizon is essentially characterized by what delimits phenomena; it is what permits phenomena to present itself to us," says the first determination of the Horizon (Geniusas, 2012: 1). Because delimitation is determination, each phenomenon's meaning is determined by its resolution — the horizon presents itself as the overall framework — within which phenomena make sense.

It is important to note that within its limits, the horizon is limitless; these two horizon symbols have been interpreted in variety of meanings. Whenever the observer's perspective shifts, the horizon varies first; an observer can widen or compress the horizon. It would help to demonstrate how to recognize horizon's genuine character. Furthermore, there is still a limit to what one can compress, improve, and shift one's perspective; nonetheless, there will always be a limit. The concept of the horizon also appears in Heidegger's writings: "There would have been no final horizon," he says. Because each horizon is represented as a new horizon, the horizon would be infinite. But if that's the case, how is the horizon expected to be what it claims to be? How can it be what delimits if it doesn't have any? A broken straight line is a boundless horizon" (Heidegger, 2010: 60).

As previously stated, the horizon is a line that connects the sea and the sky. It is, however, a strange line. Its uniqueness stems from 'this line is neither drawn nor it can be drawn.' We could all see what is beyond if we move nearer to it. Hegel demonstrated in his critique of Kant, positing a limit causes awareness to eliminate unintended objects instantly. However, things differently appeared when it came to a line that, in theory, it enables determination: The closer the being get to it, the more it recedes; the further a person goes to it, the further it separates itself. The horizon exposes itself as 'irreducibly flexible' even as a colloquial phrase. Due to its unchangeable flexibility, the horizon appears to be an 'unsurpassable' boundary. As a result, no matter how much we strive to expand our range of vision, knowledge, or experience, the field in question will always be limited. I want to emphasize the other meaning of the horizon: The horizon is a boundary that is, in theory, unsurpassable (Geniusas, 2012: 2).

The horizon we view changes depending on our 'whereabouts' or 'standpoint.' our location determines whether we can enlarge or compress the horizon. By altering our viewpoint close or far enough from the present, we may quickly broaden and compress the horizon. This essence conveyed that the horizon is not autonomous in its presence but somewhat contingent on the subject's standpoint.' It is intimately linked to the concept of 'belongingness' or situatedness.' In other words, the horizon and the 'belongingness' or situatedness are inextricably linked. This changing dynamics of 'belongingness' provides the framework for moving forward in various fields of human perception.

Even if the horizon is constantly limited, it may be changed and expanded simultaneously. It is simple to enlarge, altering one's situation: moving closer to or further away from the indeterminate line. As a result, the horizon exposes itself to be relative in terms of location. Relativity leads to the insight that the situatedness of things that determines the framing of perception that encompasses them. The issue of how we came to occupy the current standpoint becomes inextricably linked to horizon's creation. Therefore, the third sense of the horizon is obtained: 'The horizon is related to our existing situatedness' (Geniusas, 2012: 2).

5. THE HORIZON IN PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE

The technical usage of the term horizon first appears in the (Liber de Causis), the book of causes, within the domain of philosophical discourse. The 'Causes' was Aristotle's scholarly book, which gained popularity in the Middle Ages, first in Arabic and Islamic nations and then in the Latin West. The origin is unknown; however, most of the text is based on Proclus' Elements of Theology. Following William of Moerbeke's translation of Proclus' writings into Latin, Thomas Aquinas first became aware of this. As a result, though it is not sure, the Pseudo-Aristotle has been credited in its development. The philosopher Proclus was a Neo-Platonist. It helops in drawing attention to the fact that the horizon in question may be traced back to Neo-Platonic discourse in the intellectual movement.

Another alternative is Kant's use of the term horizon, which may be found in his renowned Critique of Pure Reason. Tze-Wan Kwan says that Immanuel Kant was the first to use the term "horizon" in contemporary philosophy, albeit only a few times in his works. It's difficult to believe he was the one who started to tackle the problem of the philosophical horizon (Kwan, 1990: 361-99). His initial viewpoint was as broad as that of his contemporaries and ancestors. As a result, Kant's contribution to the state of current philosophy is widely credited to his period (Morris, 1882: 270). The term horizon is used in this context in a variety of ways. The most common application is connected with human knowledge or how knowledge is possible. Kant seeks to demonstrate that mortal beings are limited, whether acquired from empirical or intellectual sources. "The conceivable objects of our cognition appear to us being a level surface, with an apparent horizon — that which marks the limit of its expanse, and which we have dubbed the notion of unconditioned wholeness," he says. It is impossible to attain this limit using empirical means, and all attempts to decide whether a priori according to a principle are futile (Kant, 1885:462).

From a spectator's vantage point, there is an access to a particular horizon, which contains many objects of human cognition. Every item of human understanding has a horizon when it is created. He discusses the specific or logical perspectives embodied inside the more remarkable genus or universal horizon. The universal is the capacity of the familiar horizon to bring disparate horizons together. According to Kant, "An observer's viewpoint has a horizon that may be said to encompass several objects that can be seen from that vantage point. There has to be an unlimited number of additional locations inside this horizon, within each, smaller and more confined horizon" (Kant, 1885: 404). Without diminishing the significance of the term horizon, it refers to his epistemological and philosophical foundations. In Kant's discussion, Geniusas does seem to show that the immersing of the horizon is for integrating the many forms of knowledge — "Kant's horizon reflections are as impressive as they are because of his philosophy's synthesizing capacities. Without exaggerating, Kant's ideas might be seen as a synthesis of the various ways the concept of the horizon has been used in modernity "(Genuisas, 2012: 4).

In light of the preceding facts, it is clear that the horizon did not arise in analytical studies. Husserl argues "In the Logical studies, I still lacked the theory of horizon-intentionality, the all-determining role of which was first brought out in Ideas," He writes in Formal and Transcendental Logic (Genuisas, 2012:11). The finding implies that the horizon's origin goes straight to his book, Ideas I. We might conclude that the release of this work marks the beginning of the intellectual Horizon (Genuisas, 2012: 3-10). However, we discovered Husserl acknowledging his debt to James' Principle of Psychology several times under the name margins. "As far as I know, James was one, under the title fringes, who became aware of the phenomena of the horizon," Husserl writes in Crisis, "so how could he delve into without the phenomenological acquired awareness of intentional objectivity and implication?"(Husserl, 1969: 264). The study lead us to an assumptions to believe that Husserl's Horizon was influenced by psychologist William James' idea of "fringes" (Aspers, 2006: 168).

Above all, we can see that Husserl would not be the first philosopher to use the term horizon. Before Husserl, other philosophers had used the phenomena in various philosophical literature. However, it is legitimate to identify him as horizon's originator, strictly intellectual. Husserl invented the horizon, a metaphorical sense, in phenomenology—his capacity to unveil the metaphysical qualities of the horizon.

In current philosophical research, many philosophers have technically analysed to promote and improve the concept of the horizon in the intellectual discourse. Heidegger, a philosopher, acknowledges his debt to Husserl in terms of the horizon, saying that he was "heavily in debt to Husserl, from whom he derived the notion of the horizon, which embodied a direction of concern" (Thiselton, 1997: 279). As a result, we notice that the horizon appears later in Heidegger's hermeneutical expositions and that he uses horizon in his philosophical texts. In the writings of Gadamer, who defined the horizon, the horizon conveys the sensation as well. "The horizon is the range of vision that comprises all that can be seen from a specific vantage point," Gadamer explains (Gadamer, 1979: 269). The horizon is undeniably becoming trendy, stylish, and generally believed in the intellectual realm. However, I think this is the current language in philosophy and that additional research is needed to determine the value of its implications in a severe philosophical examination.

6. FUSION OF HORIZONS

According to Gadamer, genuine comprehension occurs when horizons are fused. The notion was developed in variety of interpretations, such as in the field of cultures, genders, societies, classes, and other factors.' It also entails communication between the self and the other entities to arrive at a shared basis for interpreting the specific topic. According to Gadamer, a fusion broadens, extends, and increases one's horizon. This way of thinking is further developed by other thinkers such as Levinas, Derrida, and others, who emphasize difference over similarity (Madison, 1994: 45-76). It's important to remember that the potential of horizon fusion necessitates the existence of two or more different horizons (Wang, 2007: 15-26). A horizon is established by one's traditions, prejudices, culture, language, and circumstances in which one is actively engaged; these features enable one to construct a specific horizon. Ultimately, it's a whole historical lifeworld—the world wherein one chooses to live out one's life, a web of meanings, beliefs, values, and conventions - the universe from a particular historical perspective or a way of life (Vilhauer, 2010: 61-75). A person's horizon is continually moving; it goes along with him as he meets new location and experiences new things in the process. The migration to horizons different from one's own suggests the prospect of transformation. When one's horizon collides with another, it leads to a change and even merges with the other horizon, which is entirely unrelated to one's

circumstance (Bernstein, 1996: 13-34). I want to show that the fusion of horizons is an appropriate model for understanding different culture in cross-cultural encounters.

Partly aware in the vertical sense' is the criticism against Gadamer's horizon fusion theory. With the merger between the past and the contemporary, people comprehend the meaning passed down from one cultural tradition. However, the charge is most noticeable in the 'horizontal sense' - the fusion of people, culture, and literature from many horizons. His critics agree that his horizon fusion fundamentally opposes alterity, alienation, and diversity. The intention of the fusion to remove estrangement denotes ignorance, exclusivity, and the demolition of the Other's distinctiveness. The concept tries to merge different perspectives or opinions into a single identity. In other words, it's a way of rejecting individual differences, and denying flexibility is required. They acknowledged that there are a variety of situations in which diversity is non-reducible in human existence (Vilhauer, 2010: 126-32). Derrida argues that horizon fusion's primary objective misses the fact that any assertion to 'understand' must be counterintuitive—including some acknowledgment of other people's fundamental differences. The interpreter priorly must identify the gap where 'non-understanding' in the other's position is at issue; it is a response to anything effectively other than ourselves. 'My efforts were oriented toward not overlooking the limitation that embedded in every hermeneutical perception of meaning,' Gadamer wrote in response to the critics. When I penned the phrase "Being that is understood is language," I implied that what is [Being] is never fully comprehended.' In other words, leaving a space of fully recognized incomprehension also leaves room for freedom (Vilhauer, 2010: 123).

Gadamer's horizon fusion is not as straightforward and seamless as others have assumed, as Anindita Niyogi Balslev correctly points out. It isn't easy to credit the differences of the other culture one is attempting to comprehend. For example, the individual must meet some prerequisites- and one must try to adapt to what others have to say. We frequently fail to put out the effort necessary to comprehend the other; she contends that this is a moral failure instead of an ontological impossibility. Anindita asserts that humans can put the effort to understand another is not an impossible endeavour. However, it relies on a person's determination to acquire hermeneutical practices' abilities, skills, and values (Bernstein, 1996: 29-42).

The hermeneutical interpretations are contested several times; the fusion of the self and the other is a questionable theory, as some would think. Monica Vilhauer demonstrates fusion possibilities, but time, work, and dedication will be required. In cross-cultural encounters, the fusion of horizons has become the apparent model of her analyses. Comprehension is much more akin to a skill than a theory. Mohanty argues that one can comprehend—if the other is respected as a human rather than just an extension of oneself. (Vilhauer, 2010: 32-45).

Gadamer's "fusion of horizons" significantly alters the psychological line of thought. However, there are several flaws with this idea. It's not evident how Gadamer avoided the risk of "subjective interpretation," as it does with the "New Hermeneutic." According to him, there seem to be conditions and limitations to subjectivity: the text's earlier horizon, the current diverse style of interpretations, and his traditions that seemed to resist "subjective interpretation." There have been no specific boundaries for preventing 'subjectivism,' though. In reality, each time an interpreter spends reading might result in a fresh understanding and novel insight. Another flawed theory is that Gadamer fails to offer a strategy for discriminating between genuine and wrong interpretations. In the analysis of Werner G. Jeanrond, he asserted that methodically deformed interactions could corrupt the meaning of the intended message. Gadamer doesn't come up with any criterion for identifying a lack of comprehension. He also has an open attitude toward the author's involvement in interpretation. It's complicated to reason how he can prevent different interpretations since each current scenario and point of view can lead the text anywhere it wants. Consequently, it might hamper the text and direct to a textual chaos (Osborne, 2010: 3-10).

In Understanding his point of view, starting with an argument by E. D. Hirsch, he believes that Gadamer's consideration of horizons excludes some horizon fusion right away. Hirsch contends that anything we seek to comprehend could be inside or 'beyond our horizon.' If that's so, it's impossible to understand because that's what it means beyond our horizon. There will be no fusion of horizon in any affair of the self and the other. There aren't two independent horizons to merge if it's within our horizon. Hence there's no fusion (Hirsch, 1967: 42-52). As a result, if horizons serve as boundaries for comprehension, a horizon fusion is either inconceivable or superfluous. Hirsch expresses in this way.

However, the critical question that Gadamer cannot address is just this: how could it be said that the actual purpose of a work is just beyond our grasp while still allowing for adequate understanding? Could an interpretation combine two standpoints' own and texts—unless he appropriates the needs to be considered and merges it using his own? Would a

fusion occur unless such objects to be fused are rendered tangible, that is, unless the text's original meaning is comprehended?

Hirsch combined the word 'synthesis' to blend various historical views. His main intention could not have been recognized in the practical encounter with the other. If he was loyal to his presupposition of 'radical historicity.' If the historicity confines the interpreter, he won't escape into some middle ground where historical and contemporary collide. Once an interpretation admits how he can assume a fused viewpoint that differs from his contemporary one, he can theoretically be free from the standpoint. If the case is genuine, the theory is a true central premise [that horizons confine us] is destroyed (Hirsch, 1967: 34-41). One with a distinct horizon had to come within our horizon, in which case comprehension would not need the fusion of two horizons or fall beyond our horizon, wherein instance, we would be unable to comprehend it.

On the other hand, Hirsch preoccupies with what he calls "radical historicity," the belief that we cannot understand stuff except through the lens of history. However, Gadamer does not hold this belief, the philosophical problems. Hirsch is involved with occurring whenever someone asserts knowledge of a limit on understanding. Gadamer's only way of these contradictions appears to be to claim that horizons had no boundaries. Nonetheless, he seems to state unequivocally that horizons are boundaries. Each limit present has its own set of constraints. The term "situation" is defined as a point of view that restricts one's ability to see. As a result, the idea of a "horizon" is critical to the scenario concept. The horizon in the field of view encompasses all visible from a given vantage point (Gadamer, 1979: 21-32).

The knowledge that Gadamer's "horizon" doesn't use the phrase in its daily connotation, but as a technical phrase has indeed been part of phenomenological since Edmund Husserl first, missed in most readings of Gadamer, including Hirsch's. Although the two definitions are not mutually exclusive, the technical definition highlights certain aspects of the daily phrase while downplaying others.

In technical terms, a horizon as a boundary is emphasieded, favouring a horizon as something that grows, one we can see beyond with just a little effort and something that leads toward something more significant. A horizon defines the limit of vision at any given time, yet that is not an impenetrable barrier. We can look beyond our prior horizon by traveling a little distance or ascending to the top level. In truth, most of us have a good idea of what is beyond the horizon based on previous experience. Horizons may be limited at a given moment, but some gates can expand to something more than the past; we are interested in what Husserl emphasized in his 1913 Ideas in this study.

7. CONCLUSION

The concept of horizon, as explored within phenomenological and hermeneutical traditions, reveals its richness and complexity through philosophical enquiry. Initially rooted in everyday language, the horizon has evolved into a sophisticated framework for understanding the conditions under which meaning and knowledge emerge, as evidenced in Edmund Husserl and Hans-Georg Gadamer's writings. Husserl's phenomenological insights conceptualise the horizon as both a background and boundary, an implicit field of meanings that informs all intentional actions. His notion of horizontal intentionality underscores the contextual nature of consciousness and perception, shaping how phenomena are perceived and understood.

Building on this foundation, Gadamer reorients the concept towards the dialogical and historical dimensions of knowledge. His notion of the "fusion of horizons" elucidates how diverse perspectives, each rooted in distinct traditions, languages, and life-worlds, can interact to enhance mutual understanding. In Gadamer's hermeneutics, knowledge becomes a dynamic, interpretive process achieved through careful negotiation of differences rather than their elimination. This approach posits that incorporating others' perspectives into one's interpretive framework fosters a comprehensive and inclusive understanding of meaning. However, critics such as E. D. Hirsch challenge the feasibility and legitimacy of such a fusion. From the standpoint of radical historicity, Hirsch argues that understanding is invariably constrained by one's historical and cultural context, rendering true fusion either unnecessary or unattainable. Fusion is deemed unnecessary if the object of cognition is entirely within one's grasp. Conversely, it is deemed unintelligible if it lies entirely outside it. This critique, by highlighting the enduring tension between universality and particularity in interpretation, questions the assumptions underlying Gadamer's hermeneutic theory. Despite these critiques, the notion of horizon retains significant philosophical and practical relevance. Rather than being a fixed or impermeable boundary, the horizon is a mutable, responsive line that adapts to the subject's movement and context. As emphasised by Husserl and subsequent thinkers, the horizon frames not only what is observable, but also what is imagined, anticipated, and

possible. Thus, it serves as a metaphor for the ever-evolving boundaries of knowledge and the perpetual potential for growth.

Moreover, in contexts involving intersubjective communication, multidisciplinary studies, and cross-cultural interactions, the fusion of horizons exemplifies meaningful moral engagement. It acknowledges the limitations of one's perspective while remaining open to transformation through interactions with others. Although challenges persist, particularly in avoiding interpretive relativism or the erasure of difference, the framework advocates a comprehensive and respectful approach to cross-border understanding. Husserl and Gadamer's conceptions of the horizon are pivotal to philosophical enquiry. They encapsulate the interplay between the self and others, tradition and innovation, and constraints and possibilities. Its significance lies in its capacity to illuminate the process of understanding, which is not a definitive conclusion but a continuous process shaped by dialogue, reflection, and openness to the beyond. This exploration affirms the enduring relevance of the horizon in phenomenological theory and in real-world human experiences.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

None.

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